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147 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. The economics of the cloud
Biglaiser, Gary; Crémer, Jacques; Mantovani, Andrea;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 2. Should I stay or should I go? : migrating away from an incumbent platform
Biglaiser, Gary; Crémer, Jacques; Veiga, André;2021
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 3. Price Competition, Information Acquisition, and Product Differentiation Perception
abstractWe consider the equilibrium interplay between sellers' price competition and consumers' perception of product differentiation. We analyze a situation where, before trading, consumers acquire information at a cost about their preferences between sellers' differentiated products. The incentive for information acquisition depends on the average value of products, the objective product differentiation, and their beliefs about sellers' prices. The acquired information shapes consumers' perceived product differentiation and sellers' equilibrium prices. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and study comparative statics with respect to consumer information acquisition cost and sensitivity to product differentiation. We then apply our model to platform design
Biglaiser, Gary; Gu, Jiadong; Li, Fei;2023
Availability: Link Link
4. Migration between platforms
abstractWe study incumbency advantage in markets with positive consumption externalities. Users of an incumbent platform receive stochastic opportunities to migrate to an entrant. They can accept a migration opportunity or wait for a future opportunity. In some circumstances, users have incentives to delay migration until others have migrated. If they all do so, no migration takes place, even when migration would have been Pareto-superior. This provides an endogenous micro-foundation for incumbency advantage. We use our framework to identify environments where incumbency advantage is larger.
Biglaiser, Gary; Crémer, Jacques; Veiga, André;2020
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 5. Migration between platforms
Biglaiser, Gary; Crémer, Jacques; Veiga, André;2020
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 6. Competition for Exclusivity of a Superior Input and Quality Implications
abstractTwo firms compete for exclusivity of a superior input, then choose their quality and price. Exclusive dealing is a unique equilibrium when the input changes the equilibrium quality of at least one firm. Otherwise, there also exists a non-exclusive equilibrium. The quality pass-through of the firm with exclusivity is in general above one, lowers consumer surplus and welfare unless competition is very intense. With demand asymmetry, the big firm wins exclusivity and consumer harm is lower. Banning exclusivity of only the big firm might lower total welfare and consumer surplus compared to no ban. With cost asymmetry, the less efficient firm can win exclusivity. We provide implications for digital platforms
Bedre-Defolie, Özlem; Biglaiser, Gary;2022
Availability: Link Link
7. Should I stay or should I go? : migrating away from an incumbent platform
Biglaiser, Gary; Crémer, Jacques; Veiga, André;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 3 (based on OpenCitations)
8. Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets
Biglaiser, Gary; Li, Fei; Murry, Charles; Zhou, Yiyi;2018
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link
9. The value of incumbency in heterogeneous platforms
abstractWe study the dynamics of competition in a model with network effects, an incumbent and entry. We propose a new way of representing the strategic advantages of incumbency in a static model. We then embed this static analysis in a dynamic framework with heterogeneous consumers. We completely identify the conditions under which inefficient equilibria with two platforms will emerge at equilibrium; explore the reasons why these inefficient equilibria arise; and compute the profits of the incumbent when there is only one platform at equilibrium.
Biglaiser, Gary; Crémer, Jacques;2016
Type: Arbeitspapier; Working Paper; Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability: Link Link
10. Contracts as a barrier to entry in markets with non-pivotal buyers
abstractConsidering markets with non-pivotal buyers we analyze the anti-competitive effects of breakup fees used by an incumbent facing a more efficient entrant in the future. Buyers differ in their intrinsic switching costs. Breakup fees are profitably used to foreclose entry, regardless of the entrant's efficiency advantage or level of switching costs. Banning breakup fees is beneficial to consumers and enhances the total welfare unless the entrant’s efficiency is close to the incumbent's. Inefficient foreclosure arises not because of rent shifting from the entrant, but because the incumbent uses the long-term contract to manipulate consumers' expected surplus from not signing it.
Bedre-Defolie, Özlem; Biglaiser, Gary;2016
Type: Arbeitspapier; Working Paper; Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability: Link Link