FAQ
Intro
Survey
Topics
Please select the name from the list.
If the name is not there, means it is not connected with a GND -ID?

GND: 1045702056


Click on a term to reduce result list Information symbol The result list below will be reduced to the selected search terms. The terms are generated from the titles, abstracts and STW thesaurus of publications by the respective author.

abatement coststreibhausgas emissionengreenhouse gas emissionsdairy farmingeconomic indicatorenvironmental costsdairy industryrelation indicatorsindicators creditingcrediting emissionemission rightsrights abatementcosts systematicsystematic modelingmodeling approachapproach dairydairy farmsfarms drivesdrives marginalmarginal abatementcosts greenhousegreenhouse gasesgases dairyfarms metameta modellingmodelling approachapproach comparisoncomparison ghgghg emissionemission indicatorsindicators dairyfarms respectrespect inducedinduced abatementcosts accuracyaccuracy feasibilityfeasibilityemissions tradingemission controlgreenhouse gas indicatorslatin hypercube samplingmarginal abatement costsclimate changemarginal costsghg accountingfarm level measurementcapability of indicatorsindex numberair pollution
b

Match by:
Sort by:
Records:

Years of publications: 2012 - 2014

294 records from EconBiz based on author Name Information logo


1. On the credibility of threats to avoid the deployment of solar geoengineering

Finus, Michael; Furini, Francesco;
2025
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: The PDF logo Link

2. Global public good agreements with fixed costs

abstract

We analyze a two-stage coalition formation game in which the provision of the global public good is not only associated with variable costs but also with fixed costs. We consider the assumptions that signatories share or do not share fixed costs. We show that fixed costs may imply corner solutions for equilibrium public good provision levels and generate several different coalition formation scenarios. Some scenarios are a game changer in that stable agreements and global welfare gains from cooperation are large. That is, the well-known conclusion about the “paradox of cooperation” may break down in the light of fixed costs.

Finus, Michael; Furini, Francesco;
2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link Link Link Link Link

3. The Stackelberg vs. Nash-Cournot folk-theorem in international environmental agreements

Finus, Michael; Furini, Francesco; Rohrer, Anna Viktoria;
2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link Link Link

4. The Stackelberg vs. Nash-Cournot Folk-theorem in international environmental agreements

Finus, Michael; Furini, Francesco; Rohrer, Anna Viktoria;
2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: The PDF logo Link

5. Endogenous learning in international environmental agreements : the impact of research spillovers and the degree of cooperation

André, Francisco J.; Finus, Michael;
2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: The PDF logo Link

6. A mechanism for addressing compliance and participation in global public good treaties : a comment

Finus, Michael;
2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link Link Link

7. Strategic climate policy with endogenous plant location : the role of border carbon adjustments

Elboghdadly, Noha Nagi; Finus, Michael;
2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link

8. Global climate governance in the light of geoengineering : a shot in the dark?

Finus, Michael; Furini, Francesco;
2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link

9. Global Climate Governance in the Light of Geoengineering : A Shot in the Dark?

abstract

Solar radiation management (SRM), as one form of geoengineering, has been proposed as a last exit strategy to address global warming. Even though SRM is expected to be cheap, it may be risky and associated with high collateral damages. We analyze how SRM affects equilibrium mitigation strategies, the governance architecture of a climate agreement and whether and how signatories to a climate agreement can avoid that non-signatories deploy SRM. We show under which conditions the threat to deploy geoengineering can stabilize a large climate agreement. Results are derived in a cartel formation game and all qualitative conclusions are confirmed in a repeated game framework

Finus, Michael; Furini, Francesco;
2022
Availability: Link Link

10. The Governance Architecture of Climate Agreements in the Light of Risky Geoengineering

abstract

We analyze how geoengineering, associated with a high risk of collateral damages, affects the governance architecture of climate agreements. We clarify under which conditions signatories to a climate agreement can avoid that non-signatories deploy risky geoengineering. We correct and qualify the results of Millard-Ball (2012): not only must collateral damages be above but also below a threshold such that the threat to deploy geoengineering can stabilize a climate agreement on reducing greenhouse gases

Finus, Michael; Furini, Francesco;
2022
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)

The information on the author is retrieved from: Entity Facts (by DNB = German National Library data service), DBPedia and Wikidata

Bernd Lengers


Biblio: Research Assistant, Inst. of Food and Resource Economics, Univ. of Bonn, Germany

Profession

  • Agrarwissenschaftler
  • External links

  • Gemeinsame Normdatei (GND) im Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
  • Deutsche Digitale Bibliothek
  • Virtual International Authority File (VIAF)
  • Wikidata


  • Publishing years

    1
      2014
    2
      2013

    Series