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320 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
Bester, Helmut;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 2. Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
abstractWe investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high.
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link Link Link 3. Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
abstractWe investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high.
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 4. Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 5. Fairness and competition in a bilateral matching market
abstractThis paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches theWalrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining.
Bester, Helmut;2021
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link Link Link Link 6. Fairness and Competition in a Bilateral Matching Market
abstractThis paper analyzes fairness and bargaining in a dynamic bilateral matching market. Traders from both sides of the market are pairwise matched to share the gains from trade. The bargaining outcome depends on the traders’ fairness attitudes. In equilibrium fairness matters because of market frictions. But, when these frictions become negligible, the equilibrium approaches the Walrasian competitive equilibrium, independently of the traders’ inequity aversion. Fairness may yield a Pareto improvement; but also the contrary is possible. Overall, the market implications of fairness are very different from its effects in isolated bilateral bargaining
Bester, Helmut;2023
Availability: Link Link
7. Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József;2022
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
8. Cooperation, competition, and welfare in a matching market
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József;2022
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 9. Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market
abstractWe investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high
Bester, Helmut; Sákovics, József;2022
Availability: Link Link
10. Signaling versus costly information acquisition
abstractIn Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers' productivities from their education choices. In reality, firms also use sophisticated pre-employment auditing to learn workers' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information acquisition is always associated with (partial) pooling of worker types, and education is used as a signal only if relatively few workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms, warranties, and initial public offerings.
Bester, Helmut; Lang, Matthias; Li, Jianpei;2018
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
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