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271 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Stochastic games with general payoff functions
Flesch, János; Solan, Eilon;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
2. Guessing a random function and repeated games in continuous time
Rainer, Catherine; Solan, Eilon;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
3. Electoral Competition, Electoral Uncertainty and Corruption : Theory and Evidence from India.∗
abstractIn this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption. Our theory shows that when electoral uncertainty is high, as is expected in many developing countries, there is a U-shaped relationship between electoral competition and corruption. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India. Our results imply that accountability can be weak in such contexts, despite high electoral competition
Afridi, Farzana; Bhattacharya, Sourav; Dhillon, Amrita; Solan, Eilon;2023
Availability: Link Link
4. Selling spectrum in the presence of shared networks : the case of the Israeli 5G auction
Blumrosen, Liad; Solan, Eilon;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
5. Markovian persuasion with two states
Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Hernández, Penélope; Neeman, Zvika; Solan, Eilon;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
6. When (not) to publicize inspection results
Solan, Eilon; Zhao, Chang;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
7. Electoral competition and corruption : theory and evidencefrom India
Afridi, Farzana; Dhillon, Amrita; Solan, Eilon;2019
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 8. Electoral Competition, Electoral Uncertainty and Corruption : Theory and Evidence from India.∗
abstractIn developing countries with weak enforcement institutions, there is implicitly a large reliance on electoral incentives to reduce corruption. In this paper we study the effect of electoral competition on corruption when uncertainty in elections is high, as in many developing countries. Our theory focuses on the case of high uncertainty and shows that in this case there is a U-shaped relationship between electoral competition and corruption. The U-shape becomes flatter as uncertainty increases. We illustrate the predictions of the model with village level data on audit-detected irregularities and electoral competition from India
Bhattacharya, Sourav; Afridi, Farzana; Dhillon, Amrita; Solan, Eilon;2022
Availability: Link Link
9. A course in Stochastic game theory
abstractStochastic games are have an element of chance: the state of the next round is determined probabilistically depending upon players' actions and the current state. Successful players need to balance the need for short-term payoffs while ensuring future opportunities remain high. The various techniques needed to analyze these often highly non-trivial games are a showcase of attractive mathematics, including methods from probability, differential equations, algebra, and combinatorics. This book presents a course on the theory of stochastic games going from the basics through to topics of modern research, focusing on conceptual clarity over complete generality. Each of its chapters introduces a new mathematical tool - including contracting mappings, semi-algebraic sets, infinite orbits, and Ramsey's theorem, among others - before discussing the game-theoretic results they can be used to obtain. The author assumes no more than a basic undergraduate curriculum and illustrates the theory with numerous examples and exercises, with solutions available online.
Solan, Eilon;2022
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
10. High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring
abstractWe study two-player discounted repeated games in which one player cannot monitor the other unless he pays a fixed amount. It is well known that in such a model the folk theorem holds when the monitoring cost is on the order of magnitude of the stage payoff. We analyze high frequency games in which the monitoring cost is small but still significantly higher than the stage payoff. We characterize the limit set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs as the monitoring cost tends to 0. It turns out that this set is typically a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. In particular, there might be efficient and individually rational payoffs that cannot be sustained in equilibrium. We also make an interesting connection between games with costly monitoring and games played between long-lived and short-lived players. Finally, we show that the limit set of public perfect equilibrium payoffs coincides with the limit set of Nash equilibrium payoffs. This implies that our characterization applies also to sequential equilibria.
Lehrer, Ehud; Solan, Eilon;2018
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link Link