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83 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Managerial Use of an Information System
abstractThis paper studies the influence of a manager's pre-decision use of an information system on the central office's decision to provide such a system in the first place. At the outset, the manager is ignorant about the cost of an investment project. Higher effort when using the information system raises the probability that the manager is informed at the stage of the investment proposal. Then, the central office must make the project approval decision without knowing whether it faces an informed or an ignorant manager.We derive three new results. First, we compare the central office's hurdle rates in the cases with and without a potentially ignorant manager. We show that the central office imposes a higher hurdle rate if the manager might be ignorant. Second, if the expected net present value is high (low), the manager's effort when using the information system is higher (lower) than in the First Best solution. Third, the central office strategically provides no information system if the expected net present value of the investment project exceeds a cutoff value such that even an ignorant manager's investment proposal would be approved
Böckem, Sabine; Schiller, Ulf;2014
Availability: Link Link
2. Say on Pay als Neuverhandlung von Managementverträgen : Kommentar zu Göx & Kunz: "Say on Pay - ein Überblick über Gestaltungsoptionen, ökonomische Konsequenzen und Erkentnisse aus Emperie und Laborexperimenten"
Schiller, Ulf; Göx, Robert F.; Kunz, Alexis H.;2012
Type: Aufsatz im Buch; Book section;
3. Transfer pricing based on actual versus standard costs
Lengsfeld, Stephan; Schiller, Ulf;2003
Type: Arbeitspapier; Working Paper; Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability:
Link 4. Cost-based transfer pricing
Pfeiffer, Thomas; Schiller, Ulf; Wagner, Joachim;2011
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
5. Supplier credits, limited liquidity, and timely demand information
Böckem, Sabine; Schiller, Ulf;2011
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
6. Cost Based Transfer Pricing
abstractThis paper compares the performance of alternative cost-based transfer pricing methods. We adopt an incomplete contracting framework with asymmetric information at the trading stage. Transfer pricing guides intra-company trade and provides incentives for value-enhancing specific investments. We compare actual-cost transfer prices that include a markup over marginal costs with standard-cost transfer prices that are determined either by the central office ex-ante (centralized standard-cost transfer pricing) or by the supplying division at the trading stage (reported standard-cost transfer pricing). For the actual-cost methods, we show that markups based on the joint contribution margin (contribution-margin transfer pricing) dominate purely additive markups (cost-plus transfer pricing). We obtain the following results. (i) Centralized standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex-ante face low cost uncertainty. (ii) The actual-cost methods dominate the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex-ante face high cost uncertainty and later, at the trading stage, the buying division receives sufficient cost information. (iii) Reported standard-cost transfer pricing dominates the other methods if the central office and the divisions ex-ante face high cost uncertainty, and the buyer has insufficient cost information at the trading stage
Pfeiffer, Thomas; Schiller, Ulf; Wagner, Joachim;2010
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
7. Interim Reporting and Accounting Quality
abstractWe investigate the effect of interim reporting on accounting quality. We assume that the manager has a preference for a high stock price. The manager may bias accounting reports in each sub-period. We assume that the enforcement system ties sanctions to the detected gap between total reported earnings and total cash flows at the liquidation stage. We show that there are many circumstances where interim reporting does not improve accounting quality; sometimes interim reporting even reduces it. The result is driven by the fact that biasing reports in shorter intervals goes along with lower incremental sanctions at each reporting stage. However, if effective, the bias leads to the same manipulated stock price as does an analogous reporting bias for the longer period. The incentive for increased misreporting with interim reporting is present in multiple equilibria. If there is an earnings-inflating equilibrium, the above negative effect may be offset by improved timeliness. If there is an earnings-deflating equilibrium, interim reporting unambiguously reduces accounting quality
Schiller, Ulf; de Vegt, Marcel;2010
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 5 (based on OpenCitations)
8. Level playing fields in regulated network industries : cost-based access pricing, depreciation, and capacity choice
Böckem, Sabine; Schiller, Ulf;2010
Type: Aufsatz im Buch; Book section;
9. Level Playing Fields in Regulated Network Industries : Cost-Based Access Pricing, Depreciation, and Capacity Choice
abstractWe investigate cost-based access pricing in regulated network industries. Building on recent progress in the accounting literature, we show that a regulator must choose a particular depreciation schedule, namely, relative replacement cost depreciation in order to prevent the network provider from playing manipulative games with the cost-based access price. We then show that the network provider is put at a strategic disadvantage if the regulator sets the access price equal to long-run incremental costs and the downstream market is symmetric. This result may be understood by looking at strategic interaction in the downstream market where both firms are better off if they behave “softly”. If the regulator sets a low access price, he commits the downstream competitor to price aggressively. Then, the entire burden of softening competition must be borne by the network provider. Finally, since consumer prices are decreasing in the access price, we conclude that the regulator faces a tradeoff between low consumer prices and a level playing field on the downstream market
Böckem, Sabine; Schiller, Ulf;2009
Availability: Link Link
10. Limited Liquidity, Supplier Credits, and Timely Demand Information
abstractWe consider supplier-credit contracting between a manufacturer and a liquidity-constrained dealer. We show that the timeliness according to which the dealer receives demand information has a significant impact on the optimal contract. If the manufacturer cannot be sure that a dealer without liquidity has demand information when the contract is written, the optimal contract pools an ignorant dealer with a dealer who knows that there are unfavorable demand conditions whereas dealers with favorable demand information are screened. If the dealer's liquidity rises, the manufacturer proposes a contract that resembles the solution of a classic adverse selection model in the spirit of Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982). For high liquidity, the optimal supplier-credit contract pools an ignorant dealer with dealers who have favorable demand information whereas dealers with unfavorable demand information are screened
Böckem, Sabine; Schiller, Ulf;2009
Availability: Link Link