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329 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. The talent paradox : why is it fair to reward talent but not luck?
abstractThis paper investigates how people differentiate between inequality caused by talent and inequality caused by luck in a large-scale study of the US population. We establish that people distinguish significantly between inequality due to luck and inequality due to talent, even when controlling for their beliefs about the extent to which these factors are within individual control. We refer to this as the "talent paradox". In a novel experiment, we provide evidence suggesting that individuals are more accepting of inequality caused by talent than by luck because the benefits of talent are only realized if one acts upon it. In contrast, manipulating the extent to which talent is perceived as a personal characteristic has no effect on inequality acceptance. Our findings provide new evidence on the nature of people's fairness views that sheds light on the political debate on the acceptability of inequality in society.
Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Skarpeid, Ingvild L.; Sørensen, Erik Ø.; Tungodden, Bertil;2025
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 2. The complementarity between trust and contract enforcement
abstractAgreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to some risk of exploitation. In such circumstances, trust-defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others-seems important for realizing gains from trade. This paper explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are substitutes. We show, however, that trust can be a complement, mattering more when contract enforcement is stronger. Our evidence comes from experiments that exogenously vary both trust and contract enforcement. We argue that the mechanism is equilibrium selection: richer opportunities for contract enforcement can lead to a wider set of equilibria. Trust can then become more important because it helps select between efficient and inefficient equilibria. We provide empirical evidence for this mechanism, and a corresponding theoretical framework. The complementarity of trust and strength of contract enforcement has important policy implications.
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Huffman, David; Netzer, Nick;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 3. Public discourse and socially responsible market behavior
abstractWe investigate the causal impact of public discourse on socially responsible market behavior. Across three laboratory experiments, having market participants engage in public discourse generally increases market social responsibility. These positive impacts are robust to variation in several characteristics of the discourse. We provide evidence that discourse strengthens beliefs that others support socially responsible exchange. However, relaxing requirements to engage in discourse sharply reduces its effectiveness. Our findings suggest that campaigns encouraging discussion of appropriate market behavior can have sizable impacts on addressing inefficiencies due to market failures, but that policies encouraging broad public engagement may be important.
Bartling, Björn; Valero, Vanessa; Weber, Roberto A.; Yao, Lan;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 4. The causal effect of income on market social responsibility
abstractWe investigate the relationship between consumers' income and socially responsible consumption that mitigates negative externalities. We conduct laboratory and online market experiments in which firms and consumers can exchange products that differ in the degree to which they diminish negative external impacts at the expense of higher production costs. Our treatments exogenously vary consumers' income. Across all three experiments, higher income causes an increase in the quantity of socially responsible products purchased and at least slightly increases the share of such products as part of total consumption. However, increases in total consumption resulting from higher income can increase negative externalities.
Bartling, Björn; Valero, Vanessa; Weber, Roberto A.;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 5. Fairness in winner-take-all competitions
abstractNegative externalities, social and environmental responsibility, income effects, market experimentsThis paper reports the results of a large-scale incentivized experiment investigating individuals' fairness perceptions of the extreme income inequalities generated in winner-take-all competitions. We find that extreme income inequality in winner-take-all competitions is commonly accepted in our sample of 4,000 participants from the general population of the U.S., even when the winner outperforms the runner-up by the smallest possible margin. Generally, fairness judgements are only weakly influenced by the winning margin, which reveals that the mere fact of winning-be it by a tiny margin or by a substantial gap-justifies resulting inequalities. Our results improve understanding of public attitudes toward fairness and redistributive policies in winner-take-all competitions marked by extreme income inequalities.
Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Ekström, Mathias; Sørensen, Erik Ø.; Tungodden, Bertil;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 6. Free to fail? : paternalistic preferences in the United States
Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 7. Free to fail? : paternalistic preferences in the United States
abstractWe study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders' own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators' willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder's freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder's responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set - whether the source of mistake is internal or external - and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types - libertarian paternalists and welfarists - and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 8. Free to fail? : paternalistic preferences in the United States
abstractWe study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders' own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators' willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder's freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder's responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set - whether the source of mistake is internal or external - and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types - libertarian paternalists and welfarists - and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 9. Free to fail? : paternalistic preferences in the United States
abstractWe study paternalistic preferences in two large-scale experiments with participants from the general population in the United States. Spectators decide whether to intervene to prevent a stakeholder, who is mistaken about the choice set, from making a choice that is not aligned with the stakeholders' own preferences. We find causal evidence for the nature of the intervention being of great importance for the spectators' willingness to intervene. Only a minority of the spectators implement a hard intervention that removes the stakeholder's freedom to choose, while a large majority implement a soft intervention that provides information without restricting the choice set. This finding holds regardless of the stakeholder's responsibility for being mistaken about the choice set - whether the source of mistake is internal or external - and in different subgroups of the population. We introduce a theoretical framework with two paternalistic types - libertarian paternalists and welfarists - and show that the two types can account for most of the spectator behavior. We estimate that about half of the spectators are welfarists and that about a third are libertarian paternalists. Our results shed light on attitudes toward paternalistic policies and the broad support for soft interventions.
Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 10. Free to fail? : paternalistic preferences in the united states
abstractIn this paper, we evaluate the efficiency of the French State aid plan for broadband deployment, the Plan France Très Haut Débit. According to State aid rules, public subsidies should not be substitute for private investment and should target areas with market failures. We estimate a structural model of fiber entry using a rich dataset on fiber deployment for more than 34,000 municipalities in mainland France over 2014-2019. We then assess whether private investment would have occurred in subsidized municipalities in the absence of public subsidies. We find that between 64% and 93% of the time, public subsidies were granted to municipalities where private entry would not have occurred. Overall, we estimate the cost of "inefficient" public subsidies to be between 243 and 902 million euros, with total subsidies amounting to 2,203 million euros by the end of 2019. Finally, we find that the plan helped to increase fiber coverage in subsidized municipalities in the early stages of fiber deployment.
Bartling, Björn; Cappelen, Alexander W.; Hermes, Henning; Skivenes, Marit; Tungodden, Bertil;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link