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Years of publications: 1997 - 2025

158 records from EconBiz based on author Name Information logo


1. Forward and Backward Intergenerational Goods : A Theory of Intergenerational Exchange

abstract

This paper develops a theory of intergenerational exchange for generations that are either selfish or have non-dynastic altruism. The main building blocks of the theory are forward and backward intergenerational goods (FIGs and BIGs) and the relationship between them. A FIG is a transfer from present to future generations, like parental investments in education and the preservation of the environment. A BIG is a transfer from future to present generations, like pay-as -you-go social security or taking care of elderly parents. We show that there is a fundamental difference between BIGs and FIGs. BIGs generating a positive surplus are self-sustainable, but FIGs never are. However, even with selfish generations, optimal investment in future generations can take place if the equilibrium social norm links BIGs and FIGs. The tools developed here can be used to understand a wide class of intergenerational problems, from the political economy of environmental treaties to the economics of seniority institutions. Two applications are developed in the paper: (1) the political economy of intergenerational public expenditures, and (2) investment in children within the family

Rangel, Antonio;
2022
Availability: Link

2. Democratic Policy Making with Real-Time Agenda Setting : Part 1

abstract

We examine democratic policy-making in a simple institution with real-time agenda setting. Individuals are recognized sequentially. Once recognized, an individual makes a proposal, which is immediately put to a vote. If a proposal passes, it supercedes all previously passed proposals. The policy that emerges from this process is implemented. For some familiar classes of policy spaces with rich distributional politics, we show that the last proposer is effectively a dictator under a variety of natural conditions. Most notably, this occurs whenever a sufficient number of individuals have opportunities to make proposals. Thus, under reasonably general assumptions, control of the final proposal with real-time agenda setting confers as much power as control of the entire agenda

Bernheim, Bert Douglas; Rangel, Antonio; Rayo, Luis;
2021
Availability: Link

3. Addiction and Cue-Conditioned Cognitive Processes

abstract

We propose an economic theory of addiction based on the premise that cognitive mechanisms such as attention affect behavior independently of preferences. We argue that the theory is consistent with foundational evidence (e.g. from neurosciencee and psychology) concerning the nature of decision-making and addiction. The model is analytically tractable, and it accounts for a broad range of stylized facts concerning addiction. It also generates a plausible qualitative mapping from the characteristics of substances into consumption patterns, thereby providing a basis for empirical tests. Finally, the theory provides a clear standard for evaluating social welfare, and it has a number of striking policy implications

Bernheim, Bert Douglas; Rangel, Antonio;
2021
Availability: Link

4. Can Market and Voting Institutions Generate Optimal Intergenerational Risk Sharing?

abstract

Are market and voting institutions capable of producing optimal intergenerational risk-sharing? To study this question, we consider a simple endowment economy with uncertainty and overlapping generations. Endowments are stochastic; thus it is possible to increase the welfare of every generation using intergenerational transfers that might depend on the state of the world. We characterize the transfers that are necessary to restore efficiency and compare them to the transfers that take place in markets and voting institutions. Unlike most of that literature, we study both ex-ante and interim risk-sharing. Our main conclusion is that both types of institutions have serious problems. Markets cannot generate ex-ante risk-sharing because agents can trade only after they are born. Furthermore, markets generate interim efficient insurance in some but not all economies because they cannot generate forward (old to young) intergenerational transfers. This market failure, in theory, could be corrected by government intervention. However, as long as government policy is determined by voting, intergenerational transfers might by driven more by redistributive politics than by risk sharing considerations. Successful government intervention can arise, even though agents can only vote after they are born, but only if the young determine policy in every election

Rangel, Antonio; Zeckhauser, Richard;
2021
Availability: Link

5. Behavioral Public Economics : Welfare and Policy Analysis with Non-Standard Decision-Makers

abstract

This paper has two goals. First, we discuss several emerging approaches to applied welfare analysis under non-standard ("behavioral") assumptions concerning consumer choice. This provides a foundation for Behavioral Public Economics. Second, we illustrate applications of these approaches by surveying behavioral studies of policy problems involving saving, addiction, and public goods. We argue that the literature on behavioral public economics, though in its infancy, has already fundamentally changed our understanding of public policy in each of these domains

Bernheim, Bert Douglas; Rangel, Antonio;
2021
Availability: Link

6. Intergenerational Fiscal Constitutions : How to Protect Future Generations Using Land Taxes and Federalism

abstract

This paper studies how to design a fiscal constitution that, by capitalizing intergenerational spillovers into land values, is able to protect future generations from expropriation and to generate optimal investment in intergenerational public goods. In particular, we study how to accomplish these goals by changing two dimensions of the fiscal constitution: (1) the level of government to which different types of intergenerational public goods are assigned, and (2) the tax base of the different jurisdictions. We show that the instruments required to generate capitalization of the intergenerational spillovers depend on the type of the spillover. Land taxation is the essential instrument for policies that mostly generate fiscal spillovers, such as debt and public infrastructure. By contrast, interjurisdictional competition is the essential instrument for policies that mostly generate direct spillovers, such as irreversible environmental damages. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to design a fiscal constitution that generates full capitalization of fiscal spillovers, but in general, not one that generates full capitalization of direct spillovers

Conley, John P.; Rangel, Antonio;
2021
Availability: Link

7. Adjusting to a New Technology : Experience and Training

abstract

In this paper we study how aggregate output responds to the arrival of a new General Purpose Technology (GPT) by looking at adjustment mechanisms that operate through labor markets. We show that under a wide set of circumstances the arrival of a new GPT that raises long-run output can trigger a recession in the short-run. Furthermore, we characterize features of the GPT that produce a cyclical adjustment path. An initial recession occurs whenever a higher education level is required to operate the new GPT. But a recession can also occur when the new GPT has lower educational requirements. A cyclical adjustment path is more likely when inexperienced workers are less productive with the new technology and the faster productivity rises with experience in the new sector

Helpman, Elhanan; Rangel, Antonio;
2021
Availability: Link

8. A Graphical Analysis of Some Basic Results in Social Choice

abstract

We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on the robustness of Majority Rule due to Maskin (1995). In each case, geometry provides new insights on the working and interplay of the axioms, and suggests new results including a new characterization of the entire class of Majority Rule SWFs, a strengthening of May's Theorem, and a new version of Maskin's Theorem

Cantillon, Estelle; Rangel, Antonio;
2021
Availability: Link

9. How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax Base Restrictions

abstract

This paper studies constitutional restrictions on the tax base that protect future generations from expropriation and improve the optimality of investment in Intergenerational Public Goods (IPGs). The choice of the tax base matters because it affects how intergenerational (IG) spillovers are capitalized into assets that are owned by current generations, and thus the IG politics. We show that with an income tax base, present generations expropriate future generations and produce inefficiently low levels of IPGs. By contrast, with a land tax base, IG expropriation using debt is impossible, the level of investment in IPGs is higher and, for some types of IPGs, Pareto optimal

Rangel, Antonio;
2021
Availability: Link

10. Neural Activity Reveals Preferences Without Choices

abstract

We investigate the feasibility of inferring the choices people would make (if given the opportunity) based on their neural responses to the pertinent prospects when they are not engaged in actual decision making. The ability to make such inferences is of potential value when choice data are unavailable, or limited in ways that render standard methods of estimating choice mappings problematic. We formulate prediction models relating choices to "non-choice" neural responses and use them to predict out-of-sample choices for new items and for new groups of individuals. The predictions are sufficiently accurate to establish the feasibility of our approach

Smith, Alec; Rangel, Antonio; Bernheim, B. Douglas; Camerer, Colin;
2013
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 7 (based on OpenCitations)

The information on the author is retrieved from: Entity Facts (by DNB = German National Library data service), DBPedia and Wikidata

Chulhee Lee


Alternative spellings:
Lee Chulhee
Chulhee Lee

Biblio: Tätig an der School of Economics, Seoul National Univ., Korea; tätig an der Binghamton Univ.

Profession

  • Economist
  • External links

  • Gemeinsame Normdatei (GND) im Katalog der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
  • Bibliothèque nationale de France
  • NACO Authority File
  • Virtual International Authority File (VIAF)
  • International Standard Name Identifier (ISNI)


  • Publishing years

    1
      2025
    2
      2024
    2
      2023
    5
      2022
    7
      2021
    1
      2019
    3
      2017
    1
      2014
    2
      2013
    1
      2012
    1
      2010
    6
      2009
    3
      2008
    2
      2007
    2
      2006
    3
      2005
    2
      2004
    4
      2003
    2
      2002
    2
      2001
    1
      1999
    1
      1998

    Series

    1. Working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (10)
    2. NBER Working Paper (10)
    3. BOK working paper (2)
    4. ADB economics working paper series (1)
    5. Bank of Korea WP2022-14 (1)
    6. RIETI discussion paper series (1)
    7. Columbia economics discussion paper series / Department of Economics, Columbia University (1)