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36 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. The core of school choice problems
Rong, Kang; Tang, Qianfeng; Zhang, Yongchao;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 2. On two mechanisms in job rotation problems
Gu, Yu; Zhang, Yongchao;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 3. On the solvability of three-agent task allocation with unqualified agents priority structures
Gu, Yu; Zhang, Yongchao;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 4. The impact of Chinese government promoted homestead transfer on labor migration and household's well-being : a study in three rural areas
Zhang, Yongchao; Torre, André; Ehrlich, Marianne;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
5. Weak Stability and Pareto Efficiency in School Choice
abstractWe study the trade-off between stability and students' welfare in school choice problems. We call a matching weakly stable if none of its blocking pairs can be matched in a more stable matching–one with a weakly smaller set of blocking pairs. A matching is said to be self-constrained efficient if for students it is not Pareto dominated by any more stable matching, and it is self-constrained optimal if it weakly Pareto dominates all such matchings. We show that the following are equivalent for any matching: (i) it is weakly stable and self-constrained efficient; (ii) it is self-constrained optimal; (iii) it is an efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance mechanism (EADAM) outcome under some consenting constraint; and (iv) it is exactly the EADAM outcome when its own set of blocking pairs is used as consenting constraint
Tang, Qianfeng; Zhang, Yongchao;2020
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 4 (based on OpenCitations)
6. The Core of School Choice Problems
abstractWe propose a notion of core for school choice problems. We say that a coalition of students is able to enforce a subassignment among them if, given their priorities at schools, other students together cannot exclude any of them from her assignment. An assignment is in the core if no coalition of students can enforce any subassignment among them that Pareto improves their assignments. We show that the core is always nonempty and all assignments in it are Pareto efficient. When the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism is a Pareto efficient mechanism, it always produces the unique assignment in the core
Rong, Kang; Tang, Qianfeng; Zhang, Yongchao;2020
Availability: Link Link
7. On Stable and Efficient Mechanisms for Priority-Based Allocation Problems
abstractFor school choice (priority-based allocation) problems, when the priority structure is acyclic, the associated student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is Pareto efficient and group strategy-proof (Ergin, 2002). We reveal a hidden iterative removal structure behind such deferred acceptance algorithms. A nonempty set of students is called a top fair set (TFS) if when all students apply to their most preferred schools and all schools accept the best applicants up to their quotas, students in the set are always accepted, regardless of other students' preferences. We provide an elimination process to find the maximal TFS, if any TFS exists. We show that for any priority structure, iterative removal of TFS is equivalent to the associated deferred acceptance algorithm if and only if the latter is a Pareto efficient mechanism
Rong, Kang; Tang, Qianfeng; Zhang, Yongchao;2020
Availability: Link Link
8. Weak stability and Pareto efficiency in school choice
Tang, Qianfeng; Zhang, Yongchao;2021
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link Citations: 9 (based on OpenCitations)
9. On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games
abstractThe theory of large one-shot simultaneous-play games with a biosocial typology has been presented in both the individualized and distributionalized forms-large individualized games (LIG) and large distributionalized games (LDG), respectively. Using an example of an LDG with two actions and a single trait in which some Nash equilibrium distributions cannot be induced by the Nash equilibria of the representing LIG, this paper offers three equivalence results that delineate a relationship between the two game forms. Our analysis also reveals the different roles that the Lebesgue unit interval and a saturated space play in the theory.
Khan, Mohammed Ali; Rath, Kali P.; Yu, Haomiao; Zhang, Yongchao;2017
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
10. Hierarchical Exchange Rules and the Core in Indivisible Objects Allocation
abstractWe study the allocation of indivisible objects under the general endowment structures proposed by Pápai (2000) – the consistent inheritance structures – which specify the initial endowment of objects and also the inheritance of remaining objects after subsets of agents are matched and removed. For any consistent inheritance structure and any given matching, we define the contingent endowment of an agent as the maximal set of objects that she can feasibly inherit given the consistency of endowments. Based on contingent endowment, the concepts of individual rationality and core are then generalized. We show that for each consistent inheritance structure, Pápai’s hierarchical exchange rule produces the unique core allocation and is characterized by individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness
Tang, Qianfeng; Zhang, Yongchao;2023
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 3 (based on OpenCitations)