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Peter C. Cramton
Prof.
Alternative spellings: Peter Cramton Peter Conant Cramton Peter Conant Cramton P. Cramton
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Profession
Economist
Affiliations
Universität zu Köln
Weltbank. Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
Peter Cramton is an American economist and academic. He is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, Emeritus since 2018, and holds the Market Design Chair in Economics at the University of Cologne. Cramton's research has focused on three related areas. The first is bargaining theory where he studies the role time and information play in determining bargaining outcomes. The second is auction theory and practice, where he examines the auctioning of interrelated items, such as radio spectrum, electricity, financial securities, rough diamonds, airport slots, and top-level domains. His work in bargaining and auctions is closely tied to his third theme: market design. His market design work concerns communications, energy, finance, transportation, and health industries. Cramton has written over one hundred articles. As of 2020, his work has been cited over 14,400 times according to Google Scholar. His best known publications are: "Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty", "Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently, Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty", "Strikes and Holdouts in Wage Bargaining: Theory and Data, The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment", "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions", and "The High-Frequency Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response". (Source: DBPedia)
Q30069339
Publishing years
1
2024
2
2023
7
2022
2
2021
1
2020
1
2019
4
2017
4
2015
2
2014
4
2013
6
2012
2
2011
5
2010
4
2009
5
2008
2
2007
2
2006
1
2005
3
2004
4
2002
2
2000
2
1999
6
1998
3
1997
1
1996
3
1995
2
1994
3
1992
1
1990
1
1987
1
1985
1
1984
Series
ECONtribute discussion paper (6)
Working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. (3)
Working paper series / University of Maryland, Department of Economics (2)
Market design and the spectrum auctions (2)
ECONtribute policy brief (1)
NBER working paper series (1)
Discussion papers / Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (1)
Discussion paper / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University (1)
Staff reports / Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1)
A World Bank study (1)
Policy research working paper : WPS (1)
Papers and proceedings of the ... annual congress of the European Economic Association (1)
Working paper series, domestic studies program (1)
The result list below will be reduced to the selected search terms. The terms are generated from the titles, abstracts and STW thesaurus of publications by the respective author.
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