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ex posteconomics of informationasymmetric informationasymmetrische informationauction theorygame theorymechanism designprice discriminationinformation structuresincomplete informationpricing strategymechanismus design theorieunvollkommene informationbayes correlatednash equilibriumnash gleichgewichtadditional informationsocial choicecorrelated equilibriaprinzipal agent theorieagency theoryprice competitionnichtkooperatives spielnoncooperative game
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Years of publications: 1992 - 2025
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The information on the author is retrieved from: Entity Facts (by DNB = German National Library data service), DBPedia and Wikidata
Dirk Bergemann
Prof. Dr.
B:1964 Biblio: Inst. d'Analisi Economica, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Madrid ; B.A. Frankfurt/M. 1989; Diss., Univ. of Pennsylvania 1994.
Dirk Bergemann is the Douglass & Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Computer Science at Yale University. He received his Vordiplom in economics at Goethe University Frankfurt in 1989, and both his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Bergemann's research is concerned with game theory, contract theory and mechanism design. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation. Bergemann is the foreign editor for the Review of Economic Studies, and the associate editor of several other publications, including American Economic Journal, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, and the Journal of Economic Theory. Bergemann has made important contributions to the theory of mechanism design. In his work with Stephen Morris on robust mechanism design, they relaxed common knowledge assumptions which were prevalent in the early mechanism design literature. By formulating the mechanism design problem more precisely, they showed that simple mechanisms arise endogenously. This provided a theoretical justification for the relatively simple auction designs employed in practice, when compared to the complexity of optimal auctions suggested by the early literature. Bergemann has also pioneered work with consumer behavior around dynamic pricing structures. He is a fellow of the European Economic Association. (Source: DBPedia)
Dirk Bergemann is the Douglass & Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Computer Science at Yale University. He received his Vordiplom in economics at Goethe University Frankfurt in 1989, and both his M.A. and Ph.D. at the University of Pennsylvania in 1992 and 1993, respectively. Bergemann's research is concerned with game theory, contract theory and mechanism design. His research has been supported by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship and the German National Science Foundation. Bergemann is the foreign editor for the Review of Economic Studies, and the associate editor of several other publications, including American Economic Journal, Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, and the Journal of Economic Theory. Bergemann has made important contributions to the theory of mechanism design. In his work with Stephen Morris on robust mechanism design, they relaxed common knowledge assumptions which were prevalent in the early mechanism design literature. By formulating the mechanism design problem more precisely, they showed that simple mechanisms arise endogenously. This provided a theoretical justification for the relatively simple auction designs employed in practice, when compared to the complexity of optimal auctions suggested by the early literature. Bergemann has also pioneered work with consumer behavior around dynamic pricing structures. He is a fellow of the European Economic Association. (Source: DBPedia)
Q16727468
Publishing years
3
2025
7
2024
13
2023
14
2022
14
2021
20
2020
17
2019
19
2018
19
2017
20
2016
25
2015
23
2014
22
2013
8
2012
16
2011
15
2010
11
2009
9
2008
16
2007
18
2006
10
2005
2
2004
9
2003
7
2002
9
2001
5
2000
7
1999
2
1998
3
1997
1
1996
1
1995
2
1994
1
1992
Series
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper (111)
Cowles Foundation discussion paper (110)
Discussion papers / CEPR (17)
Discussion paper / Centre for Economic Policy Research (17)
Princeton University William S. Dietrich II Economic Theory Center Research Paper (7)
Discussion paper / Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University (3)
Discussion papers / Helsinki Center of Economic Research : discussion paper (3)
CARESS working paper (2)
RICAFE working paper (2)
Economic Theory Center Working Paper (2)
World Scientific series in economic theory (2)
Discussion paper / Center for Economic Research, Tilburg University (2)
Working papers / W / Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration (1)
Les cahiers de recherche / HEC Paris (1)
EUI working paper (1)
Working paper (1)
Discussion paper series / School of Economics, the University of Hong Kong / Economics & Finance Workshop (1)
FEEM Working Paper (1)
MIT Sloan Research Paper (1)
EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings Paper (1)
University of Chicago, Becker Friedman Institute for Economics Working Paper (1)