116 records from EconBiz based on author Name

1. Private pre-decision information and the pay-performance relation

Göx, Robert F.; Michaeli, Beatrice;
2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link

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2. Voluntary Disclosure in Leader-Follower Games

abstract

We study voluntary disclosure strategies in leader-follower games where firms choose real actions sequentially after simultaneously disclosing information. We show that the leader incurs an endogenous consistency cost when withholding information because it must choose a suboptimal real action to avoid that its private information is revealed to the follower. This consistency cost induces the leader to disclose more information in equilibrium than an equally informed follower. We establish this result in the context of a voluntary disclosure model with uncertain information endowment and show that it is robust under alternative modeling choices regarding the disclosure friction, the number of followers, and the impact of firms' private information on their rivals' profit

Chen, Hui; Göx, Robert F.;
2022
Availability: Link Link

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3. Private Predecision Information and the Pay-Performance Relation

abstract

We study how the precision of managers’ private post-contract predecision information affects the pay-performance relation. Taking into account that the information environment in decentralized firms is often endogenously determined (e.g., by investment in internal accounting systems, hiring of consultants, or learning), we find that firms jointly choosing information precision and incentives may optimally tie executive pay closer to firm performance as agency problems become more pronounced. Specifically, the trade-off between information precision and incentives can render it optimal to provide agents with stronger incentives if agents are less productive, performance measures are less congruent or more susceptible to manipulation, or if agents are more risk averse. Considering that empirical studies frequently take the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) as a measure of the efficiency of real world compensation arrangements, our results provide relevant insights for empirical research studying the determinants of the relation between executive pay and firm performance

Göx, Robert F.; Michaeli, Beatrice;
2022
Availability: Link Link

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4. On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay

Göx, Robert F.; Hemmer, Thomas;
2020
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 9 (based on OpenCitations) Cited By

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5. Say on Pay, Governance Quality, and Shareholder Pressure

abstract

I examine the economic consequences of Say on Pay (SoP) for firms with different governance qualities in a setting where shareholders face informational constraints in evaluating the efficiency of the firm's compensation policy and where the firm's governance structure is endogenous. I find that the effectiveness of SoP critically depends on the firm's governance quality and its ability to adjust the board structure in response to the new regulation. However, a more effective SoP regime not necessarily benefits shareholders because it equally prevents properly (poorly) governed firms from neutralizing the unintended (intended) consequences of SoP on its compensation policy by nominating a more CEO-friendly compensation committee

Göx, Robert F.;
2019
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 7 (based on OpenCitations) Cited By

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6. Optimal Information Design and Incentive Contracts with Performance Measure Manipulation

abstract

We study how a firm owner motivates a manager to create value by optimally designing an information system and a compensation contract based on a manipulable performance measure. In equilibrium, the firm either implements a perfect or an uninformative system. The information system and the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of the compensation contract can be substitutes in a sense that the firm optimally combines a perfect information system with a low PPS or an uninformative system with a high PPS. Because the information design is endogenous, firms facing relatively high manipulation threat may offer financial incentives that are higher-powered than the ones offered by their peers facing lower manipulation threat. If the manager is in charge of implementing the information system, he chooses a perfect one unless the firm uses the information for internal control. The firm may prefer to commit to an internal control level before observing any information

Göx, Robert F.; Michaeli, Beatrice;
2019
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations) Cited By

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7. Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay

abstract

This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can benefit from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject

Ferri, Fabrizio; Göx, Robert F.;
2018
Availability: Link

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8. Executive compensation, corporate governance, and say on pay

Ferri, Fabrizio; Göx, Robert F.;
2017
Type: Sammelwerk; Collection of articles of several authors; Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 16 (based on OpenCitations) Cited By

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9. Relative Performance Evaluation in Presence of Exposure Risk

abstract

I study the consequences of a random exposure to common risk for the purpose of relative performance evaluation (RPE) and find that it significantly affects the usefulness and the empirical measurement of RPE. According to my analysis, the magnitude of the exposure risk not only determines how firms aggregate measures of common risk with measures of firm performance but also the extent to which the firms can control the impact of common risk on their own performance. Simulated regressions of my theoretical model indicate that a high exposure risk can prevent the correct identification of informative performance signals and cause a biased composition of customized peer groups. A high exposure risk also increases the likelihood of a type II error in implicit RPE tests. I evaluate two empirical strategies to control for the magnitude of the exposure risk and find that they significantly reduce the likelihood of a type II error

Göx, Robert F.;
2016
Availability: Link Link

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10. Wachstum und Höhe von Managementvergütungen : Theorien, empirische Befunde und deren Relevanz für den DAX 30

Göx, Robert F.;
2016
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 7 (based on OpenCitations) Cited By

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