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133 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. The n-player Hirshleifer contest
Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 2. The n-player Hirshleifer contest
abstractWhile the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based on the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as considered by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high and intermediate levels of noise, the equilibrium is in pure strategies, with at most one player being active. For small levels of noise, however, we find a variety of equilibria in which some but not necessarily all players randomize. In the case of homogeneous valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at least two contestants bid up to the valuation of the second-ranked contestant, while any others ultimately drop out. Thus, in the limit, equilibria of the Hirshleifer contest share important properties of equilibria of the corresponding all-pay auction.
Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 3. The n-player Hirshleifer contest
Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2023
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 4. The n-player Hirshleifer contest
Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2022
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 5. The n-player Hirshleifer contest
abstractWhile the game-theoretic analysis of conflict is often based upon the assumption of multiplicative noise, additive noise such as assumed by Hirshleifer (1989) may be equally plausible depending on the application. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium set of the n-player difference-form contest with heterogeneous valuations. For high or intermediate levels of noise, the equilibrium is in pure strategies, with at most one player being active. For small levels of noise, however, we find a variety of equilibria in which some but not necessarily all players randomize. In the case of homogeneous valuations, we obtain a partial uniqueness result for symmetric equilibria. As the contest becomes increasingly decisive, at least two contestants bid up to the valuation of the second-ranked contestant, while any others ultimately drop out. In the limit, equilibria in the Hirshleifer contest converge to equilibria in the corresponding all-pay auction.
Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 6. Equilibrium in the symmetric Hirshleifer contest : uniqueness and characterization
abstractThe symmetric two-player Hirshleifer (1989) contest is shown to admit a unique equilibrium. The support of the equilibrium strategy is finite and includes, in particular, the zero expenditure level. We also establish a lower bound for the cardinality of the support and an upper bound for the undissipated rent.
Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2018
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
7. The quasi-sorting equilibrium and incentive effects in parallel contests with multiple types of players
abstractWe study a model of two parallel contests asymmetric in the prize with multiple types of risk-neutral players. Disclosing or hiding the realized number of players in any contest is shown to be irrelevant. We observe a quasi-sorting equilibrium wherein the most competitive players tend to enter the larger contest, while all the less competitive players equally tend to enter the smaller contest. The most competitive players bid harder in the larger contest than in the smaller contest while the players of any non-top type bid equally hard across contests. The player’s effort increases in ability in each contest
Juang, Wei-Torng; Sun, Guang-Zhen; Yuan, Kuo-Chih;2021
Availability: Link Link
8. Entrepreneurship, market selection and income mobility : evidence from rural China
He, Yong; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2021
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
9. Ssu-ma ch’ien on good government
Sun, Guang-Zhen;2021
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
10. The n-player Hirshleifer contest
Ewerhart, Christian; Sun, Guang-Zhen;2020
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
Link