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167 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
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2. Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:

3. Measuring preferences for algorithms : how willing are people to cede control to algorithms?
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Tolksdorf, Michel;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
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4. Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions : the seller's view on combining posted prices and auctions
abstractIn Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms and therefore quite challenging for sellers. The paper discusses the seller's curse, a bias that sellers might fall prey to in such combined mechanisms, and how experience counterbalances this bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy-It-Now auctions.
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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5. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : a discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
abstractWe conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions.
Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:

6. Risk, reward and uncertainty in buyer-seller transactions : the seller’s view on combining posted prices and auctions
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kröger, Sabine;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:

7. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : a discontinuity in behavior infinitely repeated duopoly games
Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:

8. Cournot meets Bayes-Nash : A discontinuity in behavior in finitely repeated duopoly games
abstractWe conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions
Argenton, Cédric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Müller, Wieland;2022
Availability: Link Link
9. Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions
abstractOverbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, 'cross-game learning' may rather be understood as 'cross-game transfer', as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.
Giebe, Thomas; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:

10. Anchored strategic reasoning
abstractAnchoring is a robust behavioral phenomenon modeled predominantly as a bias in individual judgment. We propose a game-theoretic model that considers players’ beliefs about others’ behavior as a mediator for the effect of the anchor on a player’s choice. The results establish that anchoring in strategic interactions reported in the literature can be rationalized by anchored beliefs about the opponents’ intentions. Notwithstanding, we also demonstrate that a player might adjust away from rather than toward the anchor in games where choices are strategic substitutes.
Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Seres, Gyula;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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