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13 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Partial order games
Zahoransky, Valeria; Gutierrez, Julian; Harrenstein, Paul; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2022
Type: Article;
Availability:
Link Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
2. Mean-payoff games with ω-regular specifications
Gutierrez, Julian; Steeples, Thomas; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2022
Type: Article;
Availability:
Link 3. Partial order games
abstractWe introduce a non-cooperative game model in which players' decision nodes are partially ordered by a dependence relation, which directly captures informational dependencies in the game. In saying that a decision node v is dependent on decision nodes v1,…,vk, we mean that the information available to a strategy making a choice at v is precisely the choices that were made at v1,…,vk. Although partial order games are no more expressive than extensive form games of imperfect information (we show that any partial order game can be reduced to a strategically equivalent extensive form game of imperfect information, though possibly at the cost of an exponential blowup in the size of the game), they provide a more natural and compact representation for many strategic settings of interest. After introducing the game model, we investigate the relationship to extensive form games of imperfect information, the problem of computing Nash equilibria, and conditions that enable backwards induction in this new model.
Zahoransky, Valeria; Gutierrez, Julian; Harrenstein, Paul; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
4. Mean-payoff games with ω-regular specifications
abstractMulti-player mean-payoff games are a natural formalism for modelling the behaviour of concurrent and multi-agent systems with self-interested players. Players in such a game traverse a graph, while attempting to maximise a (mean-)payoff function that depends on the play generated. As with all games, the equilibria that could arise may have undesirable properties. However, as system designers, we typically wish to ensure that equilibria in such systems correspond to desirable system behaviours, for example, satisfying certain safety or liveness properties. One natural way to do this would be to specify such desirable properties using temporal logic. Unfortunately, the use of temporal logic specifications causes game theoretic verification problems to have very high computational complexity. To address this issue, we consider ω-regular specifications. These offer a concise and intuitive way of specifying system behaviours with a comparatively low computational overhead. The main results of this work are characterisation and complexity bounds for the problem of determining if there are equilibria that satisfy a given ω-regular specification in a multi-player mean-payoff game in a number of computationally relevant game-theoretic settings.
Gutierrez, Julian; Steeples, Thomas; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link Link
5. Understanding flash crash contagion and systemic risk : a micro-macro agent-based approach
Paulin, James; Calinescu, Anisoara; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2019
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 17 (based on OpenCitations)
6. The stochastic shapley value for coalitional games with externalities
Skibski, Oskar; Michalak, Tomasz; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2018
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 11 (based on OpenCitations)
7. Exogenous coalition formation in the e-marketplace based on geographical proximity
Michalak, Tomasz; Tyrowicz, Joanna; McBurney, Peter; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2009
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
8. Logic and the foundations of game and decision theory (LOFT 7)
abstractCollection of revised papers originally presented at the 7th Conference on Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory (LOFT2006).
Wooldridge, Michael J.; Hoek, W;2008
Availability: Link
9. The Computational Difficulty of Bribery in Qualitative Coalitional Games
abstractQualitative coalitional games (QCG) are representations of coalitional games in which self interested agents, each with their own individual goals, group together in order to achieve a set of goals which satisfy all the agents within that group. In such a representation, it is the strategy of the agents to find the best coalition to join. Previous work into QCGs has investigated the computational complexity of determining which is the best coalition to join. We plan to expand on this work by investigating the computational complexity of computing agent power in QCGs as well as by showing that insincere strategies, particularly bribery, are possible when the envy-freeness assumption is removed but that it is computationally difficult to identify the best agents to bribe
Dowell, Andrew; Wooldridge, Michael J.; McBurney, Peter;2007
Availability: Link Link
10. Program equilibrium: a program reasoning approach
Hoek, Wiebe van der; Witteveen, Cees; Wooldridge, Michael J.;2013
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;