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86 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Deposit competition and mortgage securitization
abstractWe study how deposit competition affects a bank’s decision to securitize mortgages. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the US as a source of competition, we find a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize mortgage loans. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in deposit costs and corresponding reductions in banks' deposit holdings. Our results are strongest among banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight a hitherto undocumented and unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.
McGowan, Danny; Nguyen, Huyen; Schaeck, Klaus;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
2. Furlough and household financial distress during the COVID-19 pandemic
Görtz, Christoph; McGowan, Danny; Yeromonahos, Mallory;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
3. The Cost of Privacy. The Impact of the California Consumer Protection Act on Mortgage Markets
abstractWe study how the introduction of a law protecting consumer data privacy affects the cost of credit in the US mortgage market. Our estimates reveal that the California Consumer Protection Act increases loan spreads charged by banks by 8 basis points but that it has no effect on the fixed origination costs charged to borrowers. In contrast, nonbanks do not charge more, possibly because they often resell to government-sponsored enterprises thereby minimizing their compliance costs. Banks also reduce their supply of credit more in lower-income areas, consistent with more informationally intense data collection practices there potentially exposing them to larger legal costs. In sum, our findings suggest that banks pass the CCPA compliance costs to borrowers through higher interest rates and reduce their legal exposure by curtailing credit where more data need to be collected
Gupta, Manish; McGowan, Danny; Ongena, Steven;2023
Availability: Link Link
4. Deposit competition and the securitisation boom
abstractWe provide novel evidence that deposit competition incentivizes banks to securitize loans. Exploiting the state-specific removal of deposit market caps across the U.S. as an exogenous source of competition, we document a 7.1 percentage point increase in the probability that banks securitize their assets. This result is driven by an 11 basis point increase in costs of deposits and a corresponding decrease in banks’ deposit growth. Our results are strongest among small and single state incumbent banks that rely more on deposit funding. These findings highlight an unintended regulatory cause that motivates banks to adopt the originate-to-distribute model.
McGowan, Danny; Nguyen, Huyen; Schaeck, Klaus;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 5. The digital credit divide : marketplace lending and entrepreneurship
Cumming, Douglas J.; Farag, Hisham; Johan, Sofia Atiqah; McGowan, Danny;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 6. Zinsaufschlag oder Übertragung durch Verbriefung? : der Umgang mit Risiken im US-Hypothekenmarkt
abstractSeit der Finanzkrise der Jahre 2007 und 2008 diskutiert die Wissenschaft darüber, wie Kreditgeber die Verbriefung von Hypotheken nutzen, um das Kreditrisiko an Dritte weiterzugeben, und wie dies zur Finanzkrise beigetragen hat. Eine aktuelle IWH-Studie betrachtet die Entscheidungssituation des Kreditgebers zwischen Risikoaufschlag und Risikoübertragung. Sie nutzt rechtliche Unterschiede in verschiedenen US-Bundesstaaten bei der Zwangsvollstreckung von Hypotheken, um daraus unterschiedliche regionale Kreditrisiken abzuleiten. Ist dieses regionale Risiko erhöht, reagieren Kreditgeber durch vermehrte Verbriefung, wenn Hypotheken zum Verkauf an halbstaatliche Agenturen (Government Sponsored Enterprises, GSE) wie Fannie Mae und Freddie Mac zugelassen sind und so gegen Ausfall versichert werden können. Bei Hypotheken, für die kein Rückkauf durch GSE infrage kommt, erhöhen die Kreditgeber dagegen die Zinsen, da sie das Kreditrisiko nicht an die Kreditkäufer weitergeben können.
McGowan, Danny; Nguyen, Huyen;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 7. Box B: a targeted furlough scheme to help the economy in downturns
Görtz, Christoph; McGowan, Danny; Mortimer-Lee, Paul;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 8. Deposit competition and mortgage securitization
McGowan, Danny; Nguyen, Huyen; Schaeck, Klaus;2024
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
9. Furlough and household financial distress during the Covid-19 pandemic
abstractWe study how furlough affects household financial distress during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furlough increases the probability of late housing and bill payments by 30% and 9%, respectively. The effects exist for individuals who rent their home, but not mortgagees who can mitigate financial distress by reducing expenditure during furlough by deferring mortgage payments though the Mortgage Holiday Scheme. Furloughed individuals significantly reduce expenditure and spend their savings to offset furlough-induced income reductions. This creates wealth inequality but lowers the probability a furloughed worker experiences financial distress after returning to work. Estimates show an 80% government contribution to furloughed workers’ wages minimizes the incidence of financial distress at the lowest cost to taxpayers.
Görtz, Christoph; McGowan, Danny; Yeromonahos, Mallory;2021
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 10. Fintech Deregulation, Competition, and Bank Deposit Costs
abstractWe analyze how the deregulation of Fintech investing affects banks’ deposit funding costs in the US. Using the exogenous removal of marketplace investing restrictions by US states, we show the cost of bank deposits increases by approximately 2.26%. The effects are attributable to deregulation provoking more intense deposit competition that reduces deposit supply by 2.1%. Large banks and those with geographically diversified branch networks can mitigate the effects of Fintech law through lower reliance on deposit funding and sourcing deposits from less competitive markets. The findings highlight the unintended consequences of the growing Fintech sector on banks
Cumming, Douglas J.; Farag, Hisham; Koirala, Santosh; McGowan, Danny;2023
Availability: Link Link
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