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145 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Tax competition with two tax instruments : and tax evasion
abstractWe consider a world in which countries apply optimal taxes on mobile capital and savings (like in Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). Firms and savers may underreport income in order to avoid or evade taxation. We show that, even in the presence of underreporting, the equilibrium under tax competition may still be constrained-efficient (in the sense that there is no scope for welfare enhancing tax coordination). This is the case if the marginal social costs of underreporting savings and investment income are equal. The model demonstrates that, if source-based taxes on capital are inefficiently low, as is often assumed, taxes on savings must be inefficiently high. Constrained-efficient tax policy minimizes the social cost of underreporting. The results are robust to introducing taxes on profit or on labor income, if these types of income can be underreported as well. We conclude that commonly held assumptions on the need for coordination under tax competition need to be revised or qualified.
Becker, Johannes; Wilson, John D.;2021
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 2. Local policy choice : theory and empirics
abstractThis paper critically surveys the growing literature on the policy choices of local governments. First, we identify various reasons for local government policy interactions, including fiscal competition, bidding for firms, yardstick competition, expenditure spillovers, and Tiebout sorting. We discuss theoretically what parameters should be estimated to determine the reason for competition among local governments. We emphasize how the policy outcomes emerging from this competition are affected by the presence of constraints imposed by higher-level governments. Second, we integrate theoretical and empirical analyses on the effects of fiscal decentralization on mobility, spillovers, fiscal externalities, economic outcomes, and distributional issues. Third, we identify key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of strategic interactions among local governments and highlight recent quasi-experimental evidence that has attempted to identify the mechanism at work. Finally, a synthesis model, containing multiple mechanisms and fiscal instruments, resolves some puzzles and provides guidance for future research.
Agrawal, David R.; Hoyt, William H.; Wilson, John D.;2020
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 3. Tax Structure and Government Behavior : Implications for Tax Policy
abstractChanges in tax policy can affect all aspects of the economy. Not only do firms and individuals change behavior, creating efficiency costs, but government expenditure choices can also change. Unless these expenditure choices had been optimal' previously, changes in response to a tax reform affect welfare and should be taken into account when designing tax policy. This paper develops a specific model of government behavior and then explores the implications of government, as well as private, behavioral responses for tax policy. In particular, we assume that government officials favor expenditure (or regulatory) choices that increase the government's budget. As a result, higher tax rates on a particular activity encourage government behavior that aids the growth of this activity. This response enables tax policy to redirect government activity in desirable directions, but it also makes Pigovian taxes on negative externalities less effective
Gordon, Roger H.; Wilson, John D.;2022
Availability: Link
4. Local policy choice : theory and empirics
Agrawal, David R.; Hoyt, William H.; Wilson, John D.;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 16 (based on OpenCitations)
5. Tax Competition with Two Tax Instruments - and Tax Evasion
Becker, Johannes; Wilson, John D.;2021
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
6. Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Taxing Risky Capital Income
abstractIn this paper, we derive a measure of the efficiency cost of taxing risky capital incomein an infinite horizon stochastic model. The resulting measure differs from all those thathave been proposed in the existing literature. It can be represented by the expression-sigma(s) T(s)c(deltaX(s)), where T(s) measures the present value of the taxes that would be paid on a unit of investment in a riskless project with the same expected depreciation rate and tax treatment as capital invested in period s, X(s), while c(X(s)) represents the certainty equivalent to the representative individual of the lottery where measures the ex post change in investment in period s due to the tax change. The paper then compares this measure with others that have appeared in the literature.We were unable to find support for the argument in Bulow-Suinmers(1984) that the efficiency cost of taxing risky capital income is much larger than that implied by the measure -sigma(s)T(s)E(deltaX(s)). In fact, we show in special cases that our measure implies a smaller efficiency cost than does the measure -sigma(s)T(s)E(deltaX(s))
Gordon, Roger H.; Wilson, John D.;2021
Availability: Link
7. Expenditure Competition
abstractGiven the temptation on government officials to use some of their budget for 'perks,' residents face the problem of inducing officials to reduce such 'waste.' The threat to vote out of office officials who perform poorly is one possible response. In this paper, we explore the effect that competition for residents induced by fiscal decentralization has on 'waste' in government. We find not only that such competition reduces waste and raises the utility of residents, but also that it should increase the desired level of public expenditures, and to a point above the level that jurisdictions would choose if they could coordinate. These results are in sharp contrast to the presumed effects from such 'tax competition,' and suggest an additional advantage of fiscal decentralization
Gordon, Roger H.; Wilson, John D.;2021
Availability: Link
8. Tax Competition and Trade Protection
abstractThis paper reconsiders the question of whether tax competition for mobile capital leads to tax rates on capital that are too low or too high from the combined viewpoint of the competing regions (or countries in an economic union). In contrast to standard models of tax competition, both commodity trade and capital mobility is allowed to occur between the competing regions and the rest of the world. A key result of the analysis is that whether the capital taxes are too low or high depends on the degree of external trade protection. When the country's central government is free to set the tariff, tax competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates. But in the absence of a tariff, tax rates can be too high. In particular, regions may choose to subsidize capital in equilibrium as a means of inducing favorable terms-of-trade effects, but the subsidy (i.e., a negative tax) will then be too low because an increase in a single region's subsidy benefits other regions by reducing their relative quantities of subsidized capital. These results are discussed in the context of the European Union's Single Market, where non-EU firms have responded to the 'Fortress of Europe' by increasing foreign direct investment
Janeba, Eckhard; Wilson, John D.;2021
Availability: Link
9. Local Policy Choice : Theory and Empirics
abstractThis paper critically surveys the growing literature on the policy choices of local governments. First, we identify various reasons for local government policy interactions, including fiscal competition, bidding for firms, yardstick competition, expenditure spillovers, and Tiebout sorting. We discuss theoretically what parameters should be estimated to determine the reason for competition among local governments. We emphasize how the policy outcomes emerging from this competition are affected by the presence of constraints imposed by higher-level governments. Second, we integrate theoretical and empirical analyses on the effects of fiscal decentralization on mobility, spillovers, fiscal externalities, economic outcomes, and distributional issues. Third, we identify key issues that arise in the empirical estimation of strategic interactions among local governments and highlight recent quasi-experimental evidence that has attempted to identify the mechanism at work. Finally, a synthesis model, containing multiple mechanisms and fiscal instruments, resolves some puzzles and provides guidance for future research
Agrawal, David R.; Wilson, John D.; Hoyt, William H.;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
10. Decentralization and International Tax Competition
abstractThis paper models tax competition between two countries that are divided into regions. In the first stage of the game, the strategy variable for each country is the division of the provision of a continuum of public goods between the central and regional governments. In the second stage, the central and regional governments choose their tax rates on capital. A country's decentralization level serves as a strategic tool through its influence on the mix of horizontal and vertical externalities that exist under tax competition. In contrast to standard tax competition models, decentralizing the provision of public goods may be welfare-enhancing
Janeba, Eckhard; Wilson, John D.;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)