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161 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Understanding bank payouts during the crisis of 2007-2009
Cziraki, Peter; Laux, Christian; Lóránth, Gyöngyi;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 2. Accounting conservatism and managerial information acquisition
Laux, Christian; Laux, Volker;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 3. The leverage effect of bank disclosures
abstractThe general view underlying bank regulation is that bank disclosures providemarket discipline and reduce banks’ risk-taking incentives. We show that bankdisclosures can increase bank leverage and bank risk. The reason stems from theinteraction between insured and uninsured debt. Bank disclosures reduce the agencyproblem between uninsured debt and equity, thereby lowering the cost of leverage forbanks. By issuing uninsured short-term debt that is repaid ahead of insured depositswhen economic conditions deteriorate, banks dilute insured deposits. Higher levelsof uninsured short-term debt increase the subsidy provided by deposit insurance,which increases banks’ risk-taking incentives. We identify conditions under whichthis negative leverage effect dominates the standard market discipline effect, so thatproviding market discipline through bank disclosures increases banks’ risk.
König, Philipp Johann; Laux, Christian; Pothier, David;2021
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link Link 4. Accounting Changes and Enforcement of Bank Capital Requirements in a Crisis
abstractA common response to systemic shocks are accounting changes that reduce the impact of losses on banks’ regulatory capital. We show that these accounting changes can increase banks' incentive to raise capital. Banks trade off the cost of raising equity and the cost of violating regulatory capital requirements. A systemic crisis weakens the enforcement of capital requirements, which reduces banks’ incentives to recapitalize. Reducing the impact of fair value or expected credit losses on banks’ regulatory capital lowers the amount of equity that banks have to raise to fulfill regulatory capital requirements. Banks that have no incentive to recapitalize under initial accounting rules can find it optimal to raise the necessary (lower) amount of equity to avoid regulatory intervention after the relaxation of the accounting rules. We discuss ex ante implications of relaxing accounting rules and differences to relaxing capital requirements
Kostic, Natalija; Laux, Christian; Muthsam, Viktoria;2023
Availability: Link Link
5. Accounting Changes and Enforcement of Bank Capital Requirements in a Crisis
Kostic, Natalija; Muthsam, Viktoria; Laux, Christian;2023
Type: Conference Paper;
Availability:
6. Accounting for financial stability : lessons from the financial crisis and future challenges
abstractThis paper examines banks' disclosures and loss recognition in the financial crisis and identifies several core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. Our analysis suggests that, going into the financial crisis, banks' disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks' exposures had arisen in markets. Similarly, the recognition of loan losses was relatively slow and delayed relative to prevailing market expectations. Among the possible explanations for this evidence, our analysis suggests that banks' reporting incentives played a key role, which has important implications for bank supervision and the new expected loss model for loan accounting. We also provide evidence that shielding regulatory capital from accounting losses through prudential filters can dampen banks' incentives for corrective actions. Overall, our analysis reveals several important challenges if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability.
Bischof, Jannis; Laux, Christian; Leuz, Christian;2020
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link Link
Citations: 3 (based on OpenCitations)
7. Accounting for financial stability : lessons from the financial crisis and future challenges
abstractThis paper investigates what we can learn from the financial crisis about the link between accounting and financial stability. The picture that emerges ten years after the crisis is substantially different from the picture that dominated the accounting debate during and shortly after the crisis. Widespread claims about the role of fair-value (or mark-to-market) accounting in the crisis have been debunked. However, we identify several other core issues for the link between accounting and financial stability. Our analysis suggests that, going into the financial crisis, banks' disclosures about relevant risk exposures were relatively sparse. Such disclosures came later after major concerns about banks' exposures had arisen in markets. Similarly, banks delayed the recognition of loan losses. Banks' incentives seem to drive this evidence, suggesting that reporting discretion and enforcement deserve careful consideration. In addition, bank regulation through its interlinkage with financial accounting may have dampened banks' incentives for corrective actions. Our analysis illustrates that a number of serious challenges remain if accounting and financial reporting are to contribute to financial stability.
Bischof, Jannis; Laux, Christian; Leuz, Christian;2018
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 8 (based on OpenCitations)
8. The leverage effect of bank disclosures
König, Philipp Johann; Laux, Christian; Pothier, David;2021
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
9. The Leverage Effect of Bank Disclosures
abstractThe general view underlying bank regulation is that bank disclosures providemarket discipline and reduce banks' risk-taking incentives. We show that bankdisclosures can increase bank leverage and bank risk. The reason stems from theinteraction between insured and uninsured debt. Bank disclosures reduce the agencyproblem between uninsured debt and equity, thereby lowering the cost of leverage forbanks. By issuing uninsured short-term debt that is repaid ahead of insured depositswhen economic conditions deteriorate, banks dilute insured deposits. Higher levelsof uninsured short-term debt increase the subsidy provided by deposit insurance,which increases banks' risk-taking incentives. We identify conditions under whichthis negative leverage effect dominates the standard market discipline effect, so thatproviding market discipline through bank disclosures increases banks' risk
König, Philipp Johann; Laux, Christian; Pothier, David;2021
Availability: Link Link
10. The Leverage Effect of Bank Disclosures
abstractThe general view underlying bank regulation is that bank disclosures provide market discipline and reduce banks’ risk-taking incentives. We show that bank disclosures can increase bank leverage and bank risk. The reason stems from the interaction between insured and uninsured debt. Bank disclosures reduce the agency problem between uninsured debt and equity, thereby lowering the cost of leverage for banks. By issuing uninsured short-term debt that is repaid ahead of insured deposits when economic conditions deteriorate, banks dilute insured deposits. Higher levels of uninsured short-term debt increase the subsidy provided by deposit insurance, which increases banks’ risk-taking incentives. We identify conditions under which this negative leverage effect dominates the standard market discipline effect, so that providing market discipline through bank disclosures increases banks’ risk
König, Philipp Johann; Laux, Christian; Pothier, David;2021
Availability: Link Link
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