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134 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation : evidence from gift-exchange experiments
abstractExplicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after incentives have been abolished. This crowding out occurs also in repeated relationships, which otherwise strongly increase effort compared to one-shot interactions. Using a unified econometric framework, we unpack these results as a function of positive and negative reciprocity, as well as the principals' wage offer and the incentive-compatibility of the contract. Crowding out is mostly due to reduced wages and not a change in reciprocal wage-effort relationships. Our systematic analysis also replicates established results on gift exchange, incentives, and crowding out of voluntary cooperation while exposed to incentives. Overall, our findings show that the behavioral consequences of explicit incentives strongly depend on the features of the situation in which they are embedded.
Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 2. Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation : evidence from gift-exchange experiments
abstractExplicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after incentives have been abolished. This crowding out occurs also in repeated relationships, which otherwise strongly increase effort compared to one-shot interactions. Using a unified econometric framework, we unpack these results as a function of positive and negative reciprocity, as well as the principals' wage offer and the incentive-compatibility of the contract. Crowding out is mostly due to reduced wages and not a change in reciprocal wage-effort relationships. Our systematic analysis also replicates established results on gift exchange, incentives, and crowding out of voluntary cooperation while exposed to incentives. Overall, our findings show that the behavioral consequences of explicit incentives strongly depend on the features of the situation in which they are embedded.
Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 3. Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation: Evidence from Gift-Exchange Experiments
Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred;2024
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
4. Incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation: Evidence from gift-exchange experiments
Gächter, Simon; Kaiser, Esther; Königstein, Manfred;2024
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
5. Influence of peer information and personality on social exclusion in a three-person dictator game
Königstein, Manfred; Zschoche, Miriam; Brown, Tashauna A.; Königstein, Moritz;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
6. Countervailing Power in a Vertical Market Experiment
abstractIn a vertical market experiment featuring a wholesale market and a retail market we investigate the countervailing power hypothesis of Galbraith (1952). Counter to standard models of imperfect competition this hypothesis proposes that increasing concentration of retail firms might be beneficial for consumers due to the retailers’ increase in power vis-`a-vis wholesalers. We vary the number of retailers (four versus two) and the outside option wholesale price (low versus high) to implement changes in retailer power. We show that reducing the number of retailers alone is insufficient to induce a lower retail price, which supports a critical view of Galbraith’s theory
Königstein, Manfred; Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G.;2022
Availability: Link Link
7. Voluntary leadership and asymmetric endowments in the investment game
abstractWe experimentally investigate variants of the investment game by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995), in which one of the two players decides who are first mover and second mover. It has been shown by Kleine, Königstein, and Rozsnyói (2014) that voluntary leadership increases both investment and backtransfer. We interpret voluntary leadership as a signal of cooperation that stimulates reciprocal cooperation. If a relatively rich player takes the lead (putting himself/herself under investment risk) this should be seen as a less strong signal of cooperation than taking the lead among equally endowed players. Indeed, we show that under asymmetric endowments, voluntary leadership has a weaker effect than under symmetric endowments.
Kleine, Fabian; Königstein, Manfred; Rozsnyói, Balázs;2018
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link Link
8. Anti-Competitive Effects of Partial Cross-Ownership : Experimental Evidence
abstractIn theory, partial cross-ownership affects product prices and consumer welfare negatively, but empirical evidence is highly controversial. For competition policy it is important whether such effects are substantial enough to cause action. We report a lab experiment on a homogeneous duopoly market with symmetric passive crossownership in which the degree of cross-ownership varies between treatments (LOW vs HIGH). We argue that the observed negative effects are substantial enough to be considered problematic in real markets
Hariskos, Wasilios; Königstein, Manfred; Papadopoulos, Konstantinos G.;2021
Availability: Link Link
9. Performance Pay, Group Selection and Group Performance
abstractWithin a laboratory experiment we investigate a principal-agent game in which agents may, first, self-select into a group task (GT) or an individual task (IT) and, second, choose work effort. In their choices of task and effort the agents have to consider pay contracts for both tasks as offered by the principal. The rational solution of the game implies that contract design may not induce agents to select GT and provide positive effort in GT. Furthermore it predicts equal behavior of agents with different productivities. In contrast, considerations of trust, reciprocity and cooperation - the social-emotional model of behavior - suggest that contract design can influence the agents' willingness to join groups and provide effort. We analyze the data by applying a two-step regression model (multinomial logit and tobit) and find that counter to the rational solution, contract design does influence both, task selection and effort choice. The principal can increase participation in work groups and can positively influence group performance. Larger payment increases the share of socially motivated agents in work groups. The selection effect is larger than the motivation effect
Königstein, Manfred; Lünser, Gabriele K.;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 3 (based on OpenCitations)
10. The Choice of the Agenda in Labor Negotiations : Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations
abstractThe labor economics literature has shown that the "efficient bargaining" model, in which wage and employment are negotiated simultaneously, is less frequently used on unionized markets than the less efficient "right-to-manage" model, in which wage is determined via bargaining and employment determined subsequently and unilaterally by the firm. This paper reports an experiment in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous within a noncooperative game. We find that participants show a preference for decision authority and choose single-issue bargaining in most cases even though efficiency is lower than in multi-issue bargaining. Furthermore, multi-issue bargaining induces unions to offer smaller payoff shares and leads to a higher conflict rate than in a single-issue bargaining
Königstein, Manfred; Villeval, Marie-Claire;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)