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305 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Vaccination gap, vaccination fraud and inefficient testing : lessons from the coronavirus pandemic
abstractA number of shortcomings in Germany’s efforts to contain the spread of the coronavirus, including fraudulent testing, vaccination fraud and insufficient testing capacity have been identified and need to be remedied before another wave or worse, another pandemic. This paper examines the failures of the deterrence instruments and proposes solutions to address them.
Beck, Hanno; Prinz, Aloys; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link Link 2. Rentenversicherung: Lebenserwartung berücksichtigen
Prinz, Aloys; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2024
Type: Article;
Availability:
Link 3. Lebenserwartung berücksichtigen : Rentenversicherung
Prinz, Aloys; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link Link
4. Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes : a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
5. Spying and imperfect commitment in first-price auctions : a case of tacit collusion
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)
6. Spying and Imperfect Commitment in First-Price Auctions : A Case of Tacit Collusion
abstractWe analyze Stackelberg leadership in a first-price auction. Leadership is induced by an information system, represented by a spy, that leaks one bidder's bid before others choose their bids. However, the leader may secretly revise his bid with some probability; therefore, the leaked bid is only an imperfect signal. Whereas leadership with perfect commitment exclusively benefits the follower, imperfect commitment yields a collusive outcome, even if the likelihood that the leader may revise his bid is arbitrarily small. This collusive impact shows up in all equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also payoff dominant
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2023
Availability: Link
7. Outsourcing via reverse auction with a built-in menu of change orders
Wolfstetter, Elmar;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
8. Vaccination Gap, Vaccination Fraud and Inefficient Testing: Lessons From the Coronavirus Pandemic
Beck, Hanno; Prinz, Aloys; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2022
Type: Article;
Availability:
Link 9. Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion : The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying
abstractWe analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity about the type of spy gives rise to a non-standard signaling problem where both sender and receiver of messages have private information and the sender has a chance to make an unobserved move. Whereas spying without counterspy exclusively benefits the spying bidder, the potential presence of a counterspy yields a collusive outcome, even if the likelihood that the spy is a counterspy is arbitrarily small. That collusive impact shows up in all equilibria and is strongest in the unique pooling equilibrium which is also the payoff dominant equilibrium
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)
10. Universal High-Speed Broadband Provision : An Alternative Policy Approach
abstractMillions of citizens and firms lack access to high speed internet, even though governmentspledged to spend huge sums of money to subsidize internet networks. In this paper we reviewsome systematic flaws of present subsidy policies and outline a promising alternative. We proposethat governments should treat the broadband infrastructure as a public responsibility and set upintelligently designed public-private partnerships that fund and temporarily operate the broadbandin exchange for collecting service fees and, if necessary, subsidies. Simple “least-present value ofrevenue” auctions should be used to award all concessions, not only those that require subsidies,and concessions should flexibly revert to public ownership depending on realized revenues. Thisprocurement method is easy to use, immune to strategic manipulations and renegotiations, andhas already proven successful in procuring toll-roads and bridges
Wolfstetter, Elmar;2021
Availability: Link Link
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