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869 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Einfluss von Handel auf Treibhausgasemissionen : Dekomposition und CGE-Modell-Analyse illustrativer wirtschaftspolitischer Regulierungsmassnahmen
Müller, André; Elbel, Roman; Hafner, Sarah; Böhringer, Christoph; Rutherford, Thomas F.;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability:
Link 2. Measures against carbon leakage : combining output-based allocation with consumption taxes
abstractCountries with ambitious climate targets are concerned about carbon leakage to countries with more lenient or no carbon pricing. A common policy measure against leakage is output-based allocation of emissions allowances, whose effectiveness could be further enhanced by consumption taxes levied on the carbon intensity of goods. We combine theoretical and numerical analysis to derive optimal combinations of output-based allocation and consumption taxes for different assumptions on the stringency of emissions reduction targets, the coverage of emissions in regulated sectors, and their trade exposure. A key analytical finding is that output-based allocation and consumption taxes are complements rather than substitutes, i.e., the extent of output-based allocation should be higher if combined with a consumption tax. A key numerical finding is that the optimal output-based allocation and consumption tax rates should be set at almost the same rate and increase substantially with the stringency of the emissions reduction targets.
Böhringer, Christoph; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 3. Measures against carbon leakage : combining output-based allocation with consumption taxes
abstractCountries with ambitious climate targets are concerned about carbon leakage to countries with more lenient or no carbon pricing. A common policy measure against leakage is output-based allocation of emissions allowances, whose effectiveness could be further enhanced by consumption taxes levied on the carbon intensity of goods. We combine theoretical and numerical analysis to derive optimal combinations of output-based allocation and consumption taxes for different assumptions on the stringency of emissions reduction targets, the coverage of emissions in regulated sectors, and their trade exposure. A key analytical finding is that output-based allocation and consumption taxes are complements rather than substitutes, i.e., the extent of output-based allocation should be higher if combined with a consumption tax. A key numerical finding is that the optimal output-based allocation and consumption tax rates should be set at almost the same rate and increase substantially with the stringency of the emissions reduction targets.
Böhringer, Christoph; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 4. Rebating revenues from unilateral emissions pricing
abstractThis paper evaluates alternative options for rebating revenues from a unilateral emissions price, focusing on energy-intensive and trade-exposed industries. A theoretical model is developed to demonstrate that conditional rebating policies—which would be distortionary in a first-best world—may be welfare-improving. For example, this could occur in a context where emissions leakage and terms-of-trade changes are associated with the introduction of an emissions price, or when political constraints prevent the emissions price from fully reflecting the social cost of the e missions. A numerical simulation model is used to quantify the differences in welfare, leakage, terms of trade, output, and emissions across carbon prices with alternative rebating options for these leakage-prone industries. The different situations of the European Union and the United States are used as examples. The findings indicate that from a domestic perspective, rebating emissions revenues proportionately to firm output is typically superior to other rebating options when the emissions price is set close to the social cost of emissions. Rebating emission revenues to reward reductions in emissions intensity is typically superior when emissions are significantly under-priced. A country that is more emissions-intensive and less exposed to leakage may prefer to rebate in proportion to total abatement when the emissions price is sufficiently low. The quantitative results indicate that there are significant welfare losses for incorrect choices of the rebating option.
Böhringer, Christoph; Fischer, Carolyn; Rivers, Nicholas;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 5. The reverse waterbed effect of sector coupling : unilateral climate policies and multilateral emissions trading
abstractIt is widely acknowledged that the transition towards a zero-emissions economy requires electrification of energy-related processes across all sectors of the economy - so-called sector coupling. In our analysis we consider countries whose electricity sectors are regulated by a multilateral emissions trading system (ETS). We examine the implications of a unilateral CO2 tax by a group of countries on emissions in their transport and buildings sectors. The tax induces a switch to electricity-based technologies (e.g., electric vehicles and heat pumps), thus raising the demand for emission allowances and their price in the electricity sector. This induces emission reductions in the electricity sectors of the other countries covered under the ETS; hence we have a "reverse waterbed effect". CO2-intensive electricity generation technologies, especially coal, are most affected by this and their output falls as a result of sector coupling. Subsidies for electricity-based technologies in the transport and buildings sectors have similar effects, and the main insights still hold if these sectors are governed by a separate ETS, as it is planned for the EU. We examine this in a stylized analytical model and use a computable general equilibrium model calibrated to data for the EU to quantify the effects. Moreover, for the case of a second ETS, our numerical results suggest that the unilateral cancellation of emission allowances in the power sector leads to substantially higher welfare losses than doing so in the transport and buildings sectors.
Böhringer, Christoph; Helm, Carsten;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 6. How to boost countries' climate ambitions : turning gains from emissions trading into gains for climate
abstractThe Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement fall short of the abatement needed to reach the 2°C target. Emissions trading could be a "costless" means to reduce the ambition gap if countries used their gains from trade for additional abatement. However, this requires cooperative behavior. We show that with emissions trading, countries' non-cooperative choices of emissions reduction contributions can lead to even more abatement, provided that these contributions may not be lower than initial NDCs. Intuitively, countries with high climate damages raise their contributions if they can meet them partly through abatement in countries with low abatement costs.
Böhringer, Christoph; Helm, Carsten; Schürer, Laura;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 7. Industrial decarbonisation in a fragmented world: an effective carbon price with a "climate contribution"
Neuhoff, Karsten; Sato, Misato; Ballesteros, Fernanda; Böhringer, Christoph; Borghesi, Simone; Cosbey, Aaron; Das, Katsuri; Ismer, Roland; Johnston, Angus; Linares, Pedro; Matikainen, Sini; Pauliuk, Stefan; Pirlot, Alice; Quirion, Philippe; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Sniegocki, Aleksander; van Asselt, Harro; Zetterberg, Lars;2025
Type: Research Report;
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Link 8. Intensity-based rebating of emission pricing revenues
abstractCarbon pricing policies worldwide are increasingly coupled with direct or indirect subsidies where emissions pricing revenues are rebated to the regulated entities. This paper analyzes the incentives created by two novel forms of rebating that reward additional emission intensity reductions: one given in proportion to output (intensity-based output rebating) and another that rebates a share of emission payments (intensity-based emission rebating). These forms are contrasted with outputbased rebating, abatement-based rebating, and lump sum rebating. Given the same emission price, intensity-based output rebating incentivizes the most intensity reductions, while abatement-based rebating incentivizes the most output reductions, and output-based rebating puts the least pressure on output (and emissions); intensitybased emissions rebating lies in between these, by implicitly subsidizing emissions while incentivizing intensity reductions. The paper supplements partial equilibrium theoretical analysis with numerical simulations to assess the performance of different mechanisms in a multisector general equilibrium model that accounts for economywide market interactions.
Böhringer, Christoph; Fischer, Carolyn; Rivers, Nicholas;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability:
Link 9. Measures against carbon leakage: Combining output-based allocation with consumption taxes
Böhringer, Christoph; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid;2024
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
10. Measures against Carbon Leakage – Combining Output-Based Allocation with Consumption Taxes
Böhringer, Christoph; Rosendahl, Knut Einar; Storrøsten, Halvor Briseid;2024
Type: Working Paper;
Availability: