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56 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies : Argentina and Brazil
abstractIn shifting to decentralized public finances, a country's central government faces certain fiscal management problems. First, during and soon after the transition, unless it reduces pending or increases its own tax resources, the central government tends to have higher deficits as it shifts fiscal resources to sub-national governments through transfers, revenue sharing, or delegation of tax bases. Reducing spending is hard, not only because cuts are always hard, but because sub-national governments might not take on expected tasks, leaving the central government with a legal or political obligation to continue spending for certain services. Second, after decentralization, the local or state government faces popular pressure to spend more and tax less, creating the tendency to run deficits. This tendency can be a problem if sub-national governments and their creditors expect or rely on bailouts by the central government. Econometric evidence from 32 large industrial and developing countries indicates that higher sub-national spending and deficits lead to greater national deficits. The authors investigate how, and how successfully, Argentina and Brazil dealt with these problems in the 1990s. In both countries, sub-national governments account for about half of public spending and are vigorous democracies in most (especially the largest) jurisdictions. The return to democracy in the 1980s revived and strengthened long-standing federal practices while weakening macroeconomic performance, resulting in unsustainable fiscal deficits, high inflation, sometimes hyperinflation, and low or negative growth. Occasional stabilization plans failed within a few years. Then Argentina (in 1991) and Brazil (in 1994) introduced successful stabilization plans. National issues were important in preventing and then bringing about macroeconomic stabilization, but so were intergovernmental fiscal relations and the fiscal management of sub-national governments. State deficits and federal transfers were often out of control in the 1980s, contributing to national macroeconomic problems. Stabilization programs in the 1990s needed to establish control, and self-control, over sub-national spending and borrowing
Dillinger, William; Webb, Steven Benjamin;2017
Availability: Link
2. Laws for Fiscal Responsibility for Subnational Discipline : International Experience
abstractFiscal responsibility laws are institutions with which multiple governments in the same economy -- national and subnational --can commit to help avoid irresponsible fiscal behavior that could have short-term advantages to one of them but that would be collectively damaging. Coordination failures with subnational governments in the 1990s contributed to macroeconomic instability and led several countries to adopt fiscal responsibility laws as part of the remedy. The paper analyzes the characteristics and effects of fiscal responsibility laws in seven countries -- Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, and Peru. Fiscal responsibility laws are designed to address the short time horizons of policymakers, free riders among government units, and principal agent problems between the national and subnational governments. The paper describes how the laws differ in the specificity of quantitative targets, the strength of sanctions, the methods for increasing transparency, and the level of government passing the law. Evidence shows that fiscal responsibility laws can help coordinate and sustain commitments to fiscal prudence, but they are not a substitute for commitment and should not be viewed as ends in themselves. They can make a positive contribution by adding to the collection of other measures to shore up a coalition of states with the central government in support of fiscal prudence. Policymakers contemplating fiscal responsibility laws may benefit from the systematic review of international practice. One common trait of successful fiscal responsibility laws for subnational governments is the commitment of the central government to its own fiscal prudence, which is usually reinforced by the application of the law at the national as well as the subnational level
Liu, Lili; Webb, Steven Benjamin;2017
Availability: Link
3. Stabilizing Intergovernmental Transfers in Latin America : A Complement to National/Subnational Fiscal Rules?
abstractThe traditional theory of ...
Gonzalez, Christian Y; Rosenblatt, David; Webb, Steven Benjamin;2016
Availability: Link
4. A New Model for Market-Based Regulation of Subnational Borrowing : The Mexican Approach
abstractTo bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments, Mexico's federal government has established a two-pillar framework that explicitly renounces federal bail-outs and establishes a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower`s credit rating. Whether the framework succeeds will depend partly on market assessments of the government's commitment to enforce bank capital rules and refrain from bailing out defaulting subnational governments.Faced with weak subnational finances that pose a risk to macroeconomic stability, Mexico's federal government in April 2000 established an innovative incentive framework to bring fiscal discipline to state and municipal governments.That framework is based on two pillars: an explicit renunciation of federal bail-outs and a Basel-consistent link between the capital-risk weighting of bank loans to subnational governments and the borrower`s credit rating.In theory, this new regulatory arrangement should reduce moral hazard among banks and their state and municipal clients; differentiate interest rates on the basis of the borrowers' creditworthiness; and elicit a strong demand for institutional development at the subnational level.But its success will depend on three factors critical to implementation:middot; Whether markets find the federal commitment not to bail out defaulting subnational governments credible.middot; Whether subnational governments have access to financing other than bank loans.middot; How well bank capital rules are enforced.This paper - a product of the Mexico - Country Department and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to understand the subnational underpinnings of sustainable, national economic framework. The authors may be contacted at mgiugale@worldbank.org, akorobow@worldbank.org, or swebb@worldbank.org
Giugale, Marcelo M.; Korobow, Adam; Webb, Steven Benjamin;2016
Availability: Link
5. Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico
abstractWebb and Gonzalez consider the malaise with the present set-up of fiscal federalism in Mexico from the points of view of the main players - the federal government, the states, the municipalities, and the citizen voters - in order to identify the areas of potential common interest as well as the direct conflicts. There is a zero-sum game on some issues, like the size of aggregate transfers, but not on others, like raising tax collection and improving accountability for service delivery. The authors consider bargain packages that combine mutually beneficial changes and, thus, might obtain broad enough political support. They analyze the bargaining packages in two main tracks - one concerning tax assignments, revenue sharing, and tax administration, and another concerning the conjunction of earmarked transfers and accountability for service provision. An important result is that almost all states would find it fiscally attractive to impose a sales tax that replaced part of the federal value-added tax (VAT), even if the federal government reduced revenue sharing enough to cover half the cost of reducing the VAT rate to make room for the state tax.This paper - a product of the Economic Policy Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to support the rationalization of the intergovernmental fiscal relations in the major federal countries
Webb, Steven Benjamin; Gonzalez, Christian Y;2016
Availability: Link
6. Decentralization and Fiscal Management in Colombia
abstractInstitutional arrangements have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems.Colombia's political geography contrasts sharply with its economy. Physical characteristics and guerilla war fragment the country geographically, yet it has a long tradition of political centrism and macroeconomic stability.Recently, with political and economic decentralization, there has been some weakening of macroeconomic performance. Dillinger and Webb explore institutional arrangements that have helped Colombia manage the fiscal aspects of decentralization, despite the country's political problems.Fiscal decentralization proceeded rapidly in Colombia. Education, health, and much infrastructure provision have been decentralized to the departmentos and municipios.Decentralization has led to substantial but not overwhelming problems, both in maintaining fiscal balance nationally (as resources are transferred to subnational levels) and in preventing unsustainable deficits by the subnational governmentsThe problems have arisen because central government interference prevents departments from controlling their costs and because of expectations of debt bailouts. Both are legacies of the earlier pattern of management from the center, and some recent changes-especially about subnational debt-may improve matters.Colombia's traditional political process has had difficulty dealing with problems of decentralization because traditional parties are weak in internal organization and have lost de facto rule over substantial territories. The fiscal problems of subnational government have been contained, however, because subnational governments are relatively weak politically and the central government, for the time being, has been able to enforce restrictions on subnational borrowing.This paper - a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Latin America and Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to examine the macroeconomic consequences of decentralization
Dillinger, William; Webb, Steven Benjamin;2016
Availability: Link
7. Fiscal Responsibility Laws for Subnational Discipline : The Latin American Experience
abstractWebb discusses fiscal responsibility laws in Latin America, with special attention to their provisions for fiscal discipline by subnational governments. He discusses why and when such laws might be useful - to help resolve the coordination problem in getting diverse governments to avoid overusing the common national credit market and to help individual governments make a time-consistent commitment for fiscal prudence. The author examines the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru, as well as the case of Mexico where other types of laws and regulations aim to achieve the same objectives of solidifying incentives for fiscal discipline at all levels of government. Fiscal responsibility laws are found to be useful in some cases, although the experience is not long enough to be certain, but they are clearly not necessary in every case, nor always sufficient to assure fiscal stability.This paper - a product of the Economic Policy Sector Unit, Latin America and the Caribbean Region - is part of a larger effort in the region to understand the dynamics of fiscal policy in a federal context
Webb, Steven Benjamin;2016
Availability: Link
8. Fiscal Management in Federal Democracies : Argentina and Brazil
abstractArgentina and Brazil - tw ...
Dillinger, William; Webb, Steven Benjamin;2016
Availability: Link
9. Bargaining for a New Fiscal Pact in Mexico
abstractThe authors consider the malaise with the present set-up of fiscal federalism in Mexico from the points of view of the main players-the federal government, the states, the municipalities, and the citizen voters-in order to identify the areas of potential common interest as well as the direct conflicts. There is a zero-sum game on some issues, like the size of aggregate transfers, but not on others, like raising tax collection and improving accountability for service delivery. The authors consider bargain packages that combine mutually beneficial changes and thus might obtain broad enough political support. They analyze the bargaining packages in two main tracks-one concerning tax assignments, revenue sharing, and tax administration, and another concerning the conjunction of earmarked transfers and accountability for service provision. An important result is that almost all states would find it fiscally attractive to impose a sales tax that replaced part of the federal value-added tax (VAT), even if the federal government reduced revenue sharing enough to cover half the cost of reducing the VAT rate to make room for the state tax.
Webb, Steven Benjamin; Gonzalez, Christian Y.;2013
Availability: Link Link
10. Laws for Fiscal Responsibility for Subnational Discipline : International Experience
abstractFiscal responsibility laws are institutions with which multiple governments in the same economy -- national and subnational --can commit to help avoid irresponsible fiscal behavior that could have short-term advantages to one of them but that would be collectively damaging. Coordination failures with subnational governments in the 1990s contributed to macroeconomic instability and led several countries to adopt fiscal responsibility laws as part of the remedy. The paper analyzes the characteristics and effects of fiscal responsibility laws in seven countries -- Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, and Peru. Fiscal responsibility laws are designed to address the short time horizons of policymakers, free riders among government units, and principal agent problems between the national and subnational governments. The paper describes how the laws differ in the specificity of quantitative targets, the strength of sanctions, the methods for increasing transparency, and the level of government passing the law. Evidence shows that fiscal responsibility laws can help coordinate and sustain commitments to fiscal prudence, but they are not a substitute for commitment and should not be viewed as ends in themselves. They can make a positive contribution by adding to the collection of other measures to shore up a coalition of states with the central government in support of fiscal prudence. Policymakers contemplating fiscal responsibility laws may benefit from the systematic review of international practice. One common trait of successful fiscal responsibility laws for subnational governments is the commitment of the central government to its own fiscal prudence, which is usually reinforced by the application of the law at the national as well as the subnational level.
Liu, Lili; Webb, Steven Benjamin;2012
Availability: Link