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110 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. A new look at physicians' responses to financial incentives : quality of care, practice characteristics, and motivations
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Kokot, Johanna; Wiesen, Daniel;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 2. Who benefits from quality competition in health care? : a theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hehenkamp, Burkhard; Kokot, Johanna;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)
3. Who benefits from quality competition in health care? : a theory and a laboratory experiment on the relevance of patient characteristics
abstractWe study how competition between physicians affects the provision of medical care. In our theoretical model physicians are faced with a heterogeneous patient population, in which patients systematically vary with regard to both, their responsiveness to the provided quality of care and their state of health. We test the behavioral predictions derived from this model in a controlled laboratory experiment. In line with the model, we observe that competition significantly improves patient benefits as long as patients are able to respond to the quality provided. For those patients, who are not able to choose a physician, competition even decreases the patient benefit compared to a situation without competition. This decrease is in contrast to our theoretical prediction implying no change in benefits for passive patients. Deviations from patient-optimal treatment are highest for passive patients in need of a low quantity of medical services. With repetition, both, the positive effects of competition for active patients as well as the negative effects of competition for passive patients become more pronounced. Our results imply that competition can not only improve but also worsen patient outcome and that patients’ responsiveness to quality is decisive.
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hehenkamp, Burkhard; Kokot, Johanna;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability:
Link 4. Bilateral communication in procurement auctions
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Heinrich, Timo; Sterner, Martin;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
5. A New Look at Physicians’ Responses to Financial Incentives : Quality of Care, Practice Characteristics, and Motivations
abstractThere is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay. Using a behavioral experiment with a representative sample of German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explain heterogeneity in quality of care, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that under performance pay quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices are most responsive to incentives and provide low quality of care, a relationship which seems to be driven by physicians practicing in suburban areas. Physicians' general altruism and regard for the health benefit of patients are significant drivers of a high quality of care
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Hennig‐Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Kokot, Johanna; Wiesen, Daniel;2023
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
6. Physicians' incentives, patients' characteristics, and quality of care : a systematic experimental comparison of fee-for-service, capitation, and pay for performance
abstractThis paper systematically studies how performance pay, complementing either baseline feefor-service or capitation, affects physicians' medical service provision and the quality of care. Using a series of controlled experiments with physicians and students, we test the incentive effect of performance pay at a within-subject level. A discrete bonus is granted if a quality threshold is reached, which varies with the patients' severity of illness. We find that performance pay significantly reduces non-optimal service provision and enhances the quality of care. Effect sizes depend on the patients' severity of illness and whether the baseline is fee-for-service or capitation. Health policy implications, including a cost benefit analysis of introducing performance pay, are discussed.
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Groß, Mona; Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Wiesen, Daniel;2021
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 7. Physicians’ Incentives, Patients’ Characteristics, and Quality of Care a Systematic Experimental Comparison of Fee-for-Service, Capitation, and Pay for Performance
abstractHow to effectively combine performance pay with the traditional payment methods capitation and fee-for-service to improve the quality of care is not well understood. To establish a systematic comparison of physicians’ behavior under these payment methods, we employ a parsimonious experimental framework with a symmetric mirror-design of incentives and a constant patient population with heterogeneous severities of illness. In a series of controlled experiments with physicians and students, we find, in line with theory, that performance pay significantly reduces non-optimal service provision and enhances the quality of care. The effect sizes depend, however, on patients’ severity of illness in that severely ill patients gain most from capitation-based performance pay while mildly ill patients do so under a fee-for-service-based system. Intermediately ill patients benefit from both payment systems in a similar way. Health policy implications are discussed, including a cost benefit analysis
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Groß, Mona; Hennig‐Schmidt, Heike; Kairies-Schwarz, Nadja; Wiesen, Daniel;2022
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)
8. Rewards for Information Provision in Patient Referrals : A Theoretical Model and an Experimental Test
abstractWe study whether bonus payments for information provision can improve the information flow between physicians. A primary care physician (PCP) decides on the provision of information of varying qualities to a specialist while referring a patient. Our theoretical model, which includes altruism and loss aversion, predicts that bonus payments increase the provision of both high- and low-quality information. Running a controlled laboratory experiment we find support for this prediction. If the beneficiary of information provision receives a higher payoff than the PCP, we observe that PCPs more often pass on high-quality information when the beneficiary is a patient. If the beneficiary receives a lower payoff than the PCP, the type of the beneficiary (specialist or patient) does not affect the provision of high-quality information
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Griebenow, Malte; Kifmann, Mathias; Then, Franziska;2021
Availability: Link Link
9. Rewards for Information Provision in Patient Referrals : A Theoretical Model and an Experimental Test
abstractWe study whether bonus payments for information provision can improve the information flow between physicians. A primary care physician (PCP) decides on the provision of information of varying qualities to a specialist while referring a patient. Our theoretical model, which includes altruism and loss aversion, predicts that bonus payments increase the provision of both high- and low-quality information. Running a controlled laboratory experiment we find support for this prediction. If the beneficiary of information provision receives a higher payoff than the PCP, we observe that PCPs more often pass on high-quality information when the beneficiary is a patient. If the beneficiary receives a lower payoff than the PCP, the type of the beneficiary (specialist or patient) does not affect the provision of high-quality information
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Griebenow, Malte; Kifmann, Mathias; Then, Franziska;2021
Availability: Link Link
10. Rewards for information provision in patient referrals : a theoretical model and an experimental test
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette; Griebenow, Malte; Kifmann, Mathias; Then, Franziska;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
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