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184 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. The effects of induced emotions on leading-by-example
abstractThis paper investigates the effects of induced emotions on leading-by example. Using an online sample of more than 1,000 participants, we observe behavior in a one-shot sequential voluntary contribution mechanism game where leaders and followers are induced to be either happy or angry. Our findings show that angry leaders contribute less than happy leaders. The same effect is observed when considering followers’ behavior. Crucially, controlling for leaders’ contributions, the mood effects on followers’ behavior disappear, implying that it is sufficient to induce emotions only on leaders in order to affect followers’ behaviour. Our findings further highlight the role of emotions as a causal force, suggesting that negative changes in well-being can bring about adverse effects on team cooperation.
Drouvelis, Michalis; Qiu, Zeyu;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 2. Priming and the gender gap in competitiveness
Barile, Lory; Drouvelis, Michalis;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 3. Emotions in hybrid financial markets
Cominelli, Lorenzo; Rho, Gianluca; Giannetti, Caterina; Cozzi, Federico; Greco, Alberto; Manduzio, Graziano A.; Chapkovski, Philipp; Drouvelis, Michalis; Scilingo, Enzo Pasquale;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link 4. Social framing effects in leadership by example : preferences or beliefs?
Cartwright, Edward; Drouvelis, Michalis;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
5. Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game
abstractExtending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, the proposers can give part of their endowment to the responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders can destroy the proposer's endowment. Although these added options lead the responders to retaliate more severely, they do not significantly influence the proposers' behavior. It is only when the proposers can give, and the responders can concurrently destroy the endowment of the proposers that the proposers take significantly less from the responders.
Drouvelis, Michalis; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Shimodaira, Yuta;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link 6. Following recommendations from public and private correlation devices in a game of chicken
abstractWe consider a specific parametric version of Chicken and two different correlation devices, public and private, with the same expected payoffs in equilibrium, which is also the best correlated equilibrium payoff for the game. Despite our choices of parameters (payoffs) in the game, in an experiment with these two correlated equilibria, we find that the rate of "following recommendations" vary significantly within and between two treatments using these devices.
Bone, John; Drouvelis, Michalis; Gürgüç, Zeynep; Ray, Indrajit;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link 7. Giving and costless retaliation in the power-to-take game
abstractExtending the power-to-take game, we explore the impact of two forces that may shape retaliation. In our 2x2 design, i) in addition to taking, the proposers can give part of their endowment to the responders, and ii) in addition to destroying their own endowment in retaliation, the responders can destroy the proposer's endowment. Although these added options lead the responders to retaliate more severely, they do not significantly influence the proposers' behavior. It is only when the proposers can give, and the responders can concurrently destroy the endowment of the proposers that the proposers take significantly less from the responders.
Drouvelis, Michalis; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Shimada, Natsumi; Shimodaira, Yuta;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 8. Introduction to the special issue on "new directions in understanding philanthropic activities"
Adena, Maja; Drouvelis, Michalis; Huck, Steffen;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link 9. Gender differences in competitiveness : the role of social incentives
abstractThe provision of social incentives in the workplace, where performance benefits a charitable cause, has been frequently used in modern organizations. In this paper, we quantify the impact of social incentives on performance under two incentive schemes: piece rate and a winner-take-all tournament. We introduce social incentives by informing individuals that 50% of their performance earnings will be donated to a charity of their own choice. Our findings indicate that, in the presence of social incentives, women increase their performance by approximately 23% and 27% in the piece rate and tournament payment schemes, respectively. These effects are sizable and significant. Despite the fact that women also become more confident when social incentives are used, their willingness to compete is not affected due to their general lack of willingness to take financial risks.
Drouvelis, Michalis; Rigdon, Mary L.;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
Link Link 10. Following recommendations from public and private correlation devices in a game of chicken
Bone, John; Drouvelis, Michalis; Gürgüç, Zeynep; Ray, Indrajit;2024
Type: Working Paper;
Availability: