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141 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Commercial Lobbying Firms : Lobbying as Business
abstractThis chapter reviews the literature on commercial lobbying. It places this literature into the context of the broader lobbying literature. Commercial lobbyists work for for-profit organizations that sell their services as intermediaries between policymakers and special interest groups. This intermediation involves the transfer of resources from special interest groups to policymakers. These resources may be information, financial contributions, or direct involvement in legislating or campaigning. Commercial lobbyists' actions may either complement or substitute for the activities of in-house lobbyists. The incentives faced by commercial lobbyists may be designed either by special interest groups, policymakers, or a combination of the two and depend on the institutional structure within which the actors interact. They may involve problems related to collective action, transaction costs, agency, and repeated games
Ellis, Christopher J.; Groll, Thomas;2022
Availability: Link Link
2. Industrial Groupings and Strategic FDI : Theory and Evidence
abstractWe show that industrial ownership structures, such as keiretsu groupings in Japan, may significantly impact firms' incentives to engage in FDI. While the previous literature has mainly focused on the cost of capital advantages enjoyed by keiretsu firms, this paper examines two relatively unexplored channels by which ownership structure matters for FDI incentives. The first channel involves the direct incentives generated via standard product and factor market interactions whereby keiretsu firms with cross-ownership consider more directly the congestion effects of further FDI into a market. The second channel involves the indirect incentives generated by sharing of information across keiretsu firms which reduces entry costs for subsequent FDI. Using data on Japanese FDI activity by both keiretsu and non-keiretsu manufacturing firms, we find evidence to support the importance of the second channel (information-sharing incentives) as an explanation for firm-level FDI patterns, but not for the first channel
Blonigen, Bruce A.; Ellis, Christopher J.; Fausten, Dietrich K.;2022
Availability: Link
3. Who lobbies whom? : special interests and hired guns
abstractWe model which special interest groups lobby which policymakers directly, and which employ for-profit intermediaries. We show that special interests affected by policy issues that frequently receive high political salience lobby policymakers directly, while those that rarely receive high political salience must employ "hired guns." This follows from the availability of repeated agency contracts between policymakers and special interests. Special interests that lobby on issues that frequently experience high political salience may be incentivized to truthfully reveal private, policy relevant, information to policymakers via the promise of a high probability future political access. For-profit intermediaries are always in the "informational lobbying market" and can be easily incentivized by policymakers to truthfully reveal private information. We also show that "insecure" policymakers, those in vulnerable seats, tend to be lobbied by professional intermediaries. Also, policymakers that are more time constrained tend to rely more on professional intermediaries for policy relevant information.
Ellis, Christopher J.; Groll, Thomas;2018
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
4. Repeated lobbying by commercial lobbyists and special interests
abstractUsing a model of repeated agency, we explain previously unexplained features of the real-world lobbying industry. Lobbying is divided between direct representation by special interests to policymakers, and indirect representation where special interests employ professional intermediaries called commercial lobbyists to lobby policymakers on their behalf. Our analytical structure allows us to explain several trends in lobbying. For example, using the observation that in the U.S. over the last 20 years policymakers have spent an increasing amount of their time fundraising as opposed to legislating, we are able to explain why the share of commercial lobbyist activity in total lobbying has risen dramatically and now constitutes over 60% of the total. The key scarce resource in our analysis is policymakers' time. They allocate this resource via implicit repeated agency contracts which are used to incent special interests and commercial lobbyists to provide a mix of financial contributions and information on policy proposals. These implicit agency contracts solve both an information problem in the presence of unverifiable policy information and a contracting problem in the absence of legal enforcement. These repeated relationship, that are often described using the pejorative term cronyism in the popular press, may in certain circumstances be welfare improving.
Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J.;2016
Type: Arbeitspapier; Working Paper; Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability: Link Link
5. Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns
abstractWe model which special interest groups lobby which policymakers directly, and which employ for-profit intermediaries. We show that special interests affected by policy issues that frequently receive high political salience lobby policymakers directly, while those that rarely receive high political salience must employ “hired guns.” This follows from the availability of repeated agency contracts between policymakers and special interests. Special interests that lobby on issues that frequently experience high political salience may be incentivized to truthfully reveal private, policy relevant, information to policymakers via the promise of a high probability future political access. For-profit intermediaries are always in the “informational lobbying market” and can be easily incentivized by policymakers to truthfully reveal private information. We also show that “insecure” policymakers, those in vulnerable seats, tend to be lobbied by professional intermediaries. Also, policymakers that are more time constrained tend to rely more on professional intermediaries for policy relevant information
Ellis, Christopher J.; Groll, Thomas;2019
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 6 (based on OpenCitations)
6. Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns
Ellis, Christopher J.; Groll, Thomas;2018
Type: Working Paper;
Availability:
7. A simple model of the commercial lobbying industry
abstractIn this paper we model the commercial lobbying industry (such as the so-called K-Street lobbyists of Washington, D.C.). In contrast to classical special interest groups commercial lobbying firms are not directly motivated by policy outcomes. They exist to make profits by selling intermediaries services between their clients and policymakers. We explain why these firms exist, and their implications for social welfare. We find that in a simple general equilibrium framework the market level of commercial lobbying services is typically socially inefficient, and characterize the nature of the distortions involved. -- lobbying ; influence activities ; information acquisition ; financial contributions ; commercial lobbying firms ; political access
Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J.;2013
Type: Arbeitspapier; Working Paper; Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability: Link Link
8. Dynamic commercial lobbying
abstractThis study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions with lobbyists simplify a policymaker's information problem in the presence of unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers’ information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker's information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome. -- dynamic lobbying ; influence activities ; information acquisition ; financial contributions ; commercial lobbying ; political access ; moral hazard
Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J.;2013
Type: Arbeitspapier; Working Paper; Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature;
Availability: Link Link
9. Dynamic dissolutions and unifications
Ellis, Christopher J.;2017
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
10. Repeated lobbying by commercial lobbyists and special interests
Groll, Thomas; Ellis, Christopher J.;2017
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 20 (based on OpenCitations)