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403 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Managing skills in organizations - evidence from a field experiment
abstractWe study the value of skill management in organizations. In a natural field experiment with 2,582 service technicians, we vary managers' ability to monitor and manage employee skills. We find that removing managers' access to hard information on employee skills reduced training intensity, work performance, and job satisfaction. Combining detailed personnel records and survey data, we show that the intervention lowered employee efforts to identify training needs and managerial attention to employee development. In particular, high-skill employees received less training to broaden their skill set and, in turn, performance losses are driven by higher completion times for complex work assignments.
Grabe, Leonhard; Sliwka, Dirk;2025
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link 2. Works councils as gatekeepers : codetermination, management practices, and job satisfaction
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk; Titz, Krystina;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
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Link 3. Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
abstractWe compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multi-rater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 4. Multi-rater performance evaluations and incentives
abstractWe compare evaluations of employee performance by individuals and groups of supervisors, analyzing a formal model and running a laboratory experiment. The model predicts that multi-rater evaluations are more precise than single-rater evaluations if groups rationally aggregate their signals about employee performance. Our controlled laboratory experiment confirms this prediction and finds evidence that this can indeed be attributed to accurate information processing in the group. Moreover, when employee compensation depends on evaluations, multi-rater evaluations tend to be associated with higher performance.
Ockenfels, Axel; Sliwka, Dirk; Werner, Peter;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 5. Strategic incentives in intermediary markets : field-experimental evidence
abstractWe investigate how to strategically motivate sales agents in intermediary markets. In collaboration with a large travel company, we run a field experiment with more than 1, 200 independently owned intermediaries that sell our study firm's own products as well as products from competitors to end customers. The intermediaries employ sales agents responsible for customer interaction. We compare the impact of different forms of monetary incentives with non-monetary incentives provided through direct support to reduce the sales agents' effort costs. We develop a conceptual formal model hypothesizing that incentives for intermediaries (i) generally increase sales, and are more effective when targeting (ii) sales agents rather than owners of the intermediaries, (iii) intermediaries with weaker monetary incentives prior to the intervention, and (iv) products where the firm has no competitive advantage. We find that providing sales-agent support increases sales, while higher commission payments to the agencies' owners has no discernible effects. Directly incentivizing sales agents through vouchers raises sales for agencies with low prior commission rates. The incentive effects are driven by products where the firm has a weaker market position, while they have no discernible effects on product sales where the firm has a strong competitive advantage. We analyze underlying mechanisms using surveys and further administrative data.
Thon, Max; Gürtler, Oliver; Heinz, Matthias; Schäfer, Kai; Sliwka, Dirk;2024
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 6. Works councils as gatekeepers : codetermination, monitoring practices, and job satisfaction
abstractThis paper analyzes the role of works councils as gatekeepers safeguarding employee's interests in the adoption of monitoring practices. We first introduce a formal model predicting that (i) the introduction of monitoring practices leads to a stronger increase (or weaker decrease) in job satisfaction when a works council is in place, (ii) that this effect should be larger the lower the prior level of employee participation and (iii) that works councils increase the likelihood of the implementation of monitoring practices at the level of individual employees. We provide evidence in line with these hypotheses using linked-employer-employee panel data from Germany. We indeed find that the adoption of formal performance appraisals and feedback interviews is associated with a significantly larger increase in job satisfaction when there is a works council. This pattern is driven by establishments without collective bargaining agreements. The evidence also suggests that works councils indeed facilitate the implementation of monitoring practices, as codetermined firms have a higher likelihood that a practice implemented on the firm level is actually applied by middle management.
Grund, Christian; Sliwka, Dirk; Titz, Krystina;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 7. Closing the gender gap in salary increases : evidence from a field experiment on promoting pay equity
abstractWe present a natural field experiment on promoting pay equity through simple modifications to the salary review process involving 623 middle managers and 8,951 subordinate employees of a large technology firm. We first document a gender gap not only in salary levels but also in salary increases. Our treatments provide for a gender-blind reallocation of the salary increase budget available to middle managers aimed at promoting pay equity, along with different variants of a corresponding decision guidance. We show that the budget reallocation combined with an explicit decision guidance, while still leaving middle managers discretion in allocating the budget, can completely eliminate the gender gap in salary increases. The treatments also do not appear to undermine the desired performance differentiation in salary increases. We thus show that simple modifications to the salary review process can go a long way toward achieving pay equity by preventing gender gaps from widening throughout employees' careers.
Alfitian, Jakob; Deversi, Marvin; Sliwka, Dirk;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 8. Closing the gender gap in salary increases : evidence from a field experiment on promoting pay equity
abstractWe present a natural field experiment on promoting pay equity through simple modifications to the salary review process involving 623 middle managers and 8,951 subordinate employees of a large technology firm.We first document a gender gap not only in salary levels but also in salary increases. Our treatments provide for a gender-neutral reallocation of the salary increase budget available to middle managers aimed at promoting pay equity, along with different variants of a corresponding decision guidance. We show that the budget reallocation combined with an explicit decision guidance, while still leaving managers discretion in allocating the budget, can completely eliminate the gender gap in salary increases. The treatments also do not appear to undermine desired performance differentiation in salary increases. We thus show that simple modifications to the salary review process can go a long way toward achieving pay equity, preventing the widening of gender gaps throughout the career.
Alfitian, Jakob; Deversi, Marvin; Sliwka, Dirk;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 9. The targeted assignment of incentive schemes
abstractA central question in designing optimal policies concerns the assignment of individuals with different observable characteristics to different treatments. We study this question in the context of increasing workers' performance by using targeted incentives based on measurable worker characteristics. To do so, we ran two large-scale experiments. The key results are that (i) performance can be predicted by accurately measured personality traits, (ii) a machine learning algorithm can detect such heterogeneity in worker responses to different schemes, and (iii) a targeted assignment of schemes to individual workers increases performance in a second experiment significantly above the level achieved by the single best scheme.
Opitz, Saskia; Sliwka, Dirk; Vogelsang, Timo; Zimmermann, Tom;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link 10. Social preferences and rating biases in subjective performance evaluations
abstractWe study the determinants of biases in subjective performance evaluations in an MTurk experiment to test the implications of a standard formal framework of rational subjective evaluations. In the experiment, subjects in the role of workers work on a real effort task. Subjects in the role of supervisors observe subsamples of the workers' output and assess their performance. We conduct 6 experimental treatments varying (i) whether workers' pay depends on the performance evaluation, (ii) whether supervisors are paid for the accuracy of their evaluations, and (iii) the precision of the information available to supervisors. In line with the predictions of the model of optimal evaluations we find that ratings are more lenient and less accurate when they determine bonus payments and that rewards for accuracy reduce leniency. When supervisors have access to more detailed performance information their ratings vary to a stronger extent with observed performance. In contrast to the model's prediction we do not find that more prosocial supervisors always provide more lenient ratings, but that they invest more time in the rating task and achieve a higher rating accuracy.
Kusterer, David J.; Sliwka, Dirk;2022
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
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Link Link