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30 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Courts : a historical political economy perspective
Clark, Tom S.; Vanberg, Georg;2024
Type: Aufsatz im Buch; Book section;
2. Contractarianism, constitutionalism, and the status quo
Munger, Michael C.; Vanberg, Georg;2023
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
3. Feuding, arbitration, and the emergence of an independent judiciary
Broman, Benjamin; Vanberg, Georg;2022
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability:
Link Citations: 19 (based on OpenCitations)
4. William R. Keech : in memoriam
Chappell, Henry W.; Munger, Michael C.; Vanberg, Georg; Keech, William R.;2021
Type: Nachruf; Gedächtnisschrift
Availability:
Link 5. The least dangerous branch? Public choice, constitutional courts, and democratic governance
Vanberg, Georg;2019
Type: Aufsatz im Buch; Book section;
Availability: Link
6. Paper Tigers : Or How Much Will Courts Protect Rights in a Financial Crisis?
abstractConstitutions often contain rules that are meant to constrain the behavior of future governments during crises. Anti-discrimination rules and protections against expropriation of private property are classic examples. But when crisis hits, politicians are typically tempted by their short-run interests to try to bypass these rules. Enforcement of such constitutional constraints is therefore often placed in the hands of courts. But can courts serve as effective enforcement mechanisms in crisis times? We argue that courts, deciding in the middle of a crisis, will often be tempted to convert what are supposed to be hard rules into softer standards, effectively negating the constraining effect of these provisions on policymakers. While existing literature has argued that weak courts are particularly likely to engage in such behavior when confronted by strong executives, we argue that similar dynamics can also develop between strong courts and weak executives. Using examples from the recent sovereign debt crisis in the Euro area, we illustrate both logics
Gulati, G. Mitu; Vanberg, Georg;2018
Availability: Link Link
7. Institutions and the crisis
abstractThe Florence School of Banking and Finance at the European University Institute's Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies and the Brevan Howard Centre at Imperial College London, in cooperation with BAFFI CAREFIN at Bocconi University and with the kind support of the European Investment Bank Institute, organised on 26 April 2018 a conference entitled 'Institutions and the Crisis'. This event follows the tradition, established in 2011, to gather yearly in Florence the leading economists, lawyers, political scientists and policy makers to discuss Europe's economic and financial governance, in the light of the most pressing policy priorities, challenges and future prospects. In particular, this year's conference was convened to critically analyse, review and debate the most salient elements and gaps of Europe's post-crisis institutional architecture. The event was opened by the first panel, which looked back at the way the EU Institutions managed the financial crisis and drew analytical and practical insights from both a research and public policy perspective. Discussions in the panel evaluated the European crisis management, going beyond the established view that Europe did 'too little too late'. The panellists reflected on the capacity of EU institutions and instruments to manage interdependencies stemming from a common currency. The second panel discussed the role of the various European courts in tackling the recent financial crisis, particularly assessing how they discussed, challenged and legitimized the EU's key crisis response mechanisms and decisions. Speakers discussed whether courts are likely to be effective enforcement mechanisms for the new fiscal rules and assessed how judicial control interfered with crisis decisions by other public authorities. The discussion in the final panel was focused on the Eurozone's future institutional prospects, looking at the crucial reform steps necessary to make the EMU and the euro sustainable and 'future-proof ', discussing the existence of possible alternatives for ensuring the stability of the Euro, as well as addressing the difficult balance between risk-reduction and risk-sharing measures that Europe must find in the current populist context, to stay on course in EMU reform. The event follows a 2017 conference entitled 'The Changing Geography of Finance and Regulation in Europe', a 2016 conference entitled 'Filling the Gaps in Governance: The Case of Europe,' a 2015 conference entitled 'The New Financial Architecture in the Eurozone,' a 2014 conference entitled 'Bearing the Losses from Bank and Sovereign Default in the Eurozone', a 2013 conference 'Political, Fiscal and Banking Union in the Eurozone,' a 2012 conference, 'Governance for the Eurozone: Integration or Disintegration, and that of 2011, 'Life in the Eurozone With or Without Sovereign Default.' As with all the previous conferences, the debate after each panel and was lively and thoughtful. We prefer not to take a stance here on any of the issues but simply provide in this book the contributions by individual speakers and let the reader draw his or her own conclusions.
Allen, Franklin; Carletti, Elena; Gray, Joanna; Gulati, Mitu; Schlosser, Pierre; Valla, Natacha; Buchheit, Lee C.; De Witte, Bruno; Erce, Aitor; Garzarelli, Francesco; Münchau, Wolfgang; Patrin, Maria; Pisani-Ferry, Jean; Saarenheimo, Tuomas; Tomé Muguruza, Baudilio; Vanberg, Georg; Wieser, Thomas; Zettelmeyer, Jeromin; Zilioli, Chiara;2018
Availability: Link
8. Constitutional political economy, democratic theory and institutional design
Vanberg, Georg;2018
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 16 (based on OpenCitations)
9. Financial Crises and Constitutional Compromise
abstractConstitutional constraints are often designed with crisis in mind: Framers wish to constrain the exercise of power precisely in those circumstances in which policymakers will be tempted to take actions that may violate underlying normative commitments. These constraints are only as strong as the willingness and ability of courts to enforce them though; and because judges care about both themselves and policy outcomes, they are sometimes less than willing to enforce constitutional constraints. Existing scholarship has explored this phenomenon, focusing primarily on the possibility that the weakness of courts may prevent them from effectively policing constitutional boundaries in the face of governments determined to deal with a crisis. We suggest that such strategic judicial retreat may also result from judicial strength. In times of crisis, courts that command significant authority, and are likely to garner compliance with their rulings, confront a quandary that weaker courts can escape: The enforcement of constitutional boundaries may prevent an effective governmental response to a crisis. If judges are sufficiently concerned about the practical consequences of hamstringing a government under these circumstances, they may engage in judicial self-censoring not because they are weak, but because they are strong
Vanberg, Georg; Gulati, G. Mitu;2017
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
10. Contractarian Perspectives in Law and Economics
Vanberg, Georg; Vanberg, Viktor;2017
Type: Aufsatz im Buch; Book section;
Availability: Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)