Click on a term to reduce result list
The result list below will be reduced to the selected search terms. The terms are generated from the titles, abstracts and STW thesaurus of publications by the respective author.
51 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Closing the gender gap in multilateral negotiations through institutional changes
Baranski Madrigal, Andrzej; Geraldes, Diogo; Kovaliukaite, Ada; Tremewan, James;2023
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
2. The Stochastic Inequality Test - a Test for a Directional Treatment Effect
abstractThe stochastic inequality test is an exact non-parametric test that can be used to infer whether values in one random sample tend to be higher than in another. In addition it can be used to derive a confidence interval around an intuitive measure of effect size that is readily interpretable forboth ordinal and cardinal data, and allows for \textit{ex-ante} power analysis. Unlike other commonly used tests, such as the t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, this inference is valid without requiring additional, often unrealistic and untestable, assumptions about the shape of the underlying population distributions
Schlag, Karl H.; Tremewan, James;2022
Availability: Link Link
3. An experiment on gender representation in majoritarian bargaining
Baranski Madrigal, Andrzej; Geraldes, Diogo; Kovaliukaite, Ada; Tremewan, James;2024
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link
4. An experiment on gender representation in majoritarian bargaining
Baranski Madrigal, Andrzej; Geraldes, Diogo; Kovaliukaite, Ada; Tremewan, James;2021
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability:
5. An Experiment on Gender Representation in Majoritarian Bargaining
abstractWomen are underrepresented in political and business decision-making bodies across the world. To investigate the causal effect of gender representation on multilateral negotiations, we experimentally manipulate the composition of triads in a majoritarian, divide-the-dollar game. A gender gap in earnings arises in mixed-gender groups. Experiments with different subject pools show that distinct bargaining dynamics can underlie the same inequitable outcomes: While gender-biased outcomes may be caused by outright discrimination, they can also follow from more complex dynamics due to gender differences in bargaining strategies. For example, men are more likely to make opening offers and women are less likely to fight back when excluded from a coalition. Men also earn more in same-gender groups because they reach agreements faster than women, thus incurring lower delay costs. Finally, inclusive splits and unanimous agreement rates are highest in all-female groups and lowest in all-male groups suggesting that female representation increases fairness
Baranski Madrigal, Andrzej; Geraldes, Diogo; Kovaliukaite, Ada; Tremewan, James;2022
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)
6. Group Size and Pledge-and-Review Bargaining
abstractWe conduct a laboratory experiment to test whether the efficacy of the pledge-and review institution in the bilateral case reported in Lippert & Tremewan (2021) is robust to increased group size. This is a priori unclear, as with more than two players punishment for a low contribution by voting down a deal cannot be perfectly targeted, increasing the incentive to free ride. We find that the pledge-and-review institution remains effective in sustaining contributions and increasing efficiency. While the absolute efficiency gain of the pledge-and-review institution over a voluntary contribution mechanism increased, when controlling for group size there is a relative decline in the efficiency gain of the institution
Lippert, Steffen; Russell, Henry; Tremewan, James;2022
Availability: Link Link
7. An experiment on gender representation in majoritarian bargaining
Baranski, Andrzej; Geraldes, Diogo; Kovaliukaite, Ada; Tremewan, James;2022
Availability: Link
8. Voting rules in multilateral bargaining: using an experiment to relax procedural assumptions
abstractExperiments can be used to relax technical assumptions that are made by necessity in theoretical analysis, and further test the robustness of theoretical predictions. To illustrate this point we conduct a three-person bargaining experiment examining the effect of different decision rules (unanimity and majority rule). Our experiment implements the substantive assumptions of the Baron-Ferejohn model but imposes no structure on the timing of proposals and votes. We compare our results to those obtained from an earlier experiment which implemented the specific procedural assumptions of the model. Our results are in many ways very similar to those from the more structured experiment: we find that most games end with the formation of a minimum winning coalition, and unanimity rule is associated with greater delay. However, the earlier finding of "proposer power" is reversed. While some important patterns are robust to the less stringent implementation of procedural assumptions, our less structured experiment provides new insights into how multilateral bargaining may play out in real world environments with no strict procedural rules on timing of offers and agreements.
Tremewan, James; Vanberg, Christoph;2018
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link
Link Link 9. Pledge-and-Review in the Laboratory
abstractWe perform a laboratory test of Pledge-and-Review bargaining, implementing a simplified version of the model analysed in Harstad (2019). In theory, this institution should increase contributions to a public good only if there is uncertainty over the value of possible future payoffs. In contrast, we find that Pledge-and-Review increases efficiency in all the settings we investigate, and that the improvement is most persistent in our setting without uncertainty. Our results suggest that the Pledge-and-Review institution may be useful, even without uncertainty, as it allows for outcomes with higher contributions than those sustained in the absence of a review stage
Lippert, Steffen; Tremewan, James;2021
Availability: Link Link
10. Pledge-and-review in the laboratory
Lippert, Steffen; Tremewan, James;2021
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 1 (based on OpenCitations)