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311 records from EconBiz based on author Name
1. Slavery, corruption, and institutions
abstractWe develop a model where firms profit from coercing workers into employment under conditions violating national law and international conventions and where bureaucrats benefit from accepting bribes from detected perpetrators. Firms and bureaucrats are heterogeneous. Employers differ in their unscrupulousness regarding the use of slave labour whereas bureaucrats have differing intrinsic motivations to behave honestly. Moreover, there is a socially determined warm-glow effect: honest bureaucrats feel better if their colleagues are honest too. The determination of bribes is modelled via Nash bargaining between the firm and the corrupt civil servant. It is shown that multiple equilibria and hysteresis are possible. Depending on history, an economy may be trapped in a locally stable high-corruption, high-slavery equilibrium and major changes in government policies may be necessary to move the economy out of this equilibrium. Moreover, we show that trade bans that are effective in reducing slavery in the export industry tend to raise slavery in the remainder of the economy. It is possible that this leakage effect dominates the reduction of slavery in the export sector.
Rauscher, Michael; Willert, Bianca;2019
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link
Link 2. Stable international environmental agreements : large coalitions that achieve little
abstractA standard result of coalition formation games is that stable coalitions are very small if the coalition plays Nash vis-à-vis the rest of the world and if abatement costs are quadratic. It has been shown that larger coalitions and even the grand coalition are possible if the marginal abatement cost is concave. The paper confirms this result, but shows that abatement activities by large coalitions smaller than the grand coalition can be very small. This can be ‘repaired’ only by assuming that the marginal abatement cost curve changes its curvature extremely once the stable coalition has been reached.
Rauscher, Michael;2019
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
3. Slavery, corruption, and institutions
abstractWe develop a model where firms profit from coercing workers into employment under conditions violating national law and international conventions and where bureaucrats benefit from accepting bribes from detected perpetrators. Firms and bureaucrats are hetero-geneous. Employers differ in their unscrupulousness regarding the use of slave labour whereas bureaucrats have differing intrinsic motivations to behave honestly. Moreover, there is a socially determined warm-glow effect: honest bureaucrats feel better if their colleagues are honest too. The determination of bribes is modelled via Nash bargaining between the firm and the corrupt civil servant. It is shown that multiple equilibria and hysteresis are possible. Depending on history, an economy may be trapped in a locally stable high-corruption, high-slavery equilibrium and major changes in government policies may be necessary to move the economy out of this equilibrium. Moreover, we show that trade bans that are effective in reducing slavery in the export industry tend to raise slavery in the remainder of the economy. It is possible that this leakage effect dominates the reduction of slavery in the export sector.
Rauscher, Michael; Willert, Bianca;2019
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
4. Demographic change and climate change
abstractThe paper uses a continuous-time overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth and pollution accumulation over time to study the link between longevity and global warming. It is seen that increasing longevity accelerates climate change in a business-as-usual scenario without climate policy. If a binding emission target is set exogenously and implemented via a cap-and-trade system, the price of emission permits is increasing in longevity. Longevity has no effect on the optimal solution of the climate problem if perfect intergenerational transfers are feasible. If these transfers are absent, the impact of longevity is ambiguous.
Rauscher, Michael;2019
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
5. Demographic change and climate change
abstractThe paper uses a continuous-time overlapping-generations model with endogenous growth and pollution accumulation over time to study the link between longevity and global warming. It is seen that increasing longevity accelerates climate change in a business-as-usual scenario without climate policy. If a binding emission target is set exogenously and implemented via a cap-and-trade system, the price of emission permits is increasing in longevity. Longevity has no effect on the optimal solution of the climate problem if perfect intergenerational transfers are feasible. If these transfers are absent, the impact of longevity is ambiguous.
Rauscher, Michael;2019
Type: Graue Literatur; Non-commercial literature; Arbeitspapier; Working Paper;
Availability: Link Link
6. Trade and Development in a Labor Surplus Economy
abstractThis paper looks at a model in which two countries trade agricultural and manufactured commodities. The manufactured-goods sector produces with increasing returns to scale under conditions of monopolistic competition. It is shown that an increase in land endowment (or an increase in agricultural productivity) can have negative welfare implications for both countries. This outcome can result under three different scenarios: asymmetries across countries, i.e. a North-South model, a neoclassical labor market in the home country's instead of a Lewisian market, and alternative utility functions
Barbier, Edward; Rauscher, Michael;2021
Availability: Link Link
7. Economic Growth and Tax-Competing Leviathans
abstractIs tax competition good for economic growth? The paper addresses this question by means of a simple model of economic growth in which a wasteful Leviathan state sets taxes and provides productive input. Wasteful behaviour is restricted by the voter, who reduces political support if her income is reduced. The intensity of tax competition is modelled via variation of a parameter measuring the mobility of the tax base. It is shown that the effects of increased mobility of the tax base on economic growth are ambiguous and that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, which in this model equals the rate of intratemporal substitution between the government's own consumption and its political support, is a decisive variable in this context
Rauscher, Michael;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 34 (based on OpenCitations)
8. Fiscal Competition in Space and Time : An Endogenous-Growth Approach
abstractIs tax competition good for economic growth? The paper addresses this question by means of a simple model of endogenous growth. There are many small jurisdictions in a large federation and individual governments benevolently maximise the welfare of immobile residents. Investment is costly: Quadratic installation and de-installation costs limit the mobility of capital. The paper looks at optimal taxation and long-run growth. In particular, the effects of variations in the cost parameter on economic growth and taxation are considered. It is shown that balanced endogenous growth paths do not always exist and effects of changes in installation costs are ambiguous
Becker, Daniel Thomas; Rauscher, Michael;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)
9. Voluntary Emission Reductions, Social Rewards, and Environmental Policy
abstractSocial norms and intrinsic motivations lead to environmentally friendly behaviour even in the absence of environmental policy. This paper looks at the interactions of social norms and environmental regulation in their impact on individual behaviour. People obtain social rewards for voluntary abatement efforts. These social rewards may be crowded out by environmental regulation taking the shape of standards or taxes. Moreover, the paper shows that environmental externalities and externalities related to social norms interact and that an optimal environmental policy should consider both types of externalities. From a general welfare point of view, emission taxes are superior to emission standards, but people responsive to social rewards prefer standards
Rauscher, Michael;2021
Availability: Link Link
Citations: 6 (based on OpenCitations)
10. Modern slavery, corruption, and hysteresis
Rauscher, Michael; Willert, Bianca;2020
Type: Aufsatz in Zeitschrift; Article in journal;
Availability: Link
Citations: 2 (based on OpenCitations)